

## *Social Attitudes of the Youth Population in Hong Kong*

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*Preferred citation:*

Chiu, Stephen Wing-kai. *Social Attitudes of the Youth Population in Hong Kong*. Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010.

**Social Attitudes of the Youth Population in Hong Kong**

**《香港年青人口的社會態度》**

**Final Report**

**Submitted by**

**Public Policy Research Centre  
Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies  
The Chinese University of Hong Kong**

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Appendix 1: Questionnaire of Telephone Survey, May-June 2010

# **Preface**

## **Background and Objective of the Study**

This study was commissioned by the Central Policy Unit (CPU) of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in February 2010. The objective of the study is to investigate the possible sources of influence on emergent social conflicts and tensions among the youth population in Hong Kong. This study seeks answers to four main questions:

- (1) Does the younger generation have unique socio-political orientations vis-à-vis older cohorts? Are there any distinctive variations in the values and orientation within this younger generation?
- (2) How does the younger generation perceive its own position and opportunities in the socio-economic system, and in particular the chances for improving its social and economic status?
- (3) Does the younger generation exhibit a distinctive set of postmaterialist values?
- (4) What are the socio-demographic and biographical factors that could account for variations in socio-political orientations among the younger generation?

## **Methodology**

This study uses two approaches to the collection of relevant information and data. First, secondary analysis of existing survey data helps to unveil the characteristics of the younger generations born after 1980 and those born before



then. Second, a telephone survey has been conducted to collect information pertaining to the social attitudes, beliefs, values, orientations and behaviors among Hong Kong citizens born between 1970 and 1995.

### **Research Team**

Members in the research team of the Public Policy Research Centre, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong include:

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## **Executive Summary**

### **1. Background of the Study**

In the past two years, generational differences and conflicts have evoked growing interest from the mass media and the public. Whenever incidents of social unrest visibly involve the younger generation, the mass media usually cite anecdotal evidence to argue that “generational conflicts” are operative. In that narrative, the beliefs and attitudes of the younger generation are interpreted to be a consequence of frustration caused by the limited opportunity to move up the social ladder or from having their upward social mobility completely blocked.

These anecdotal observations and interpretations have crystallized around the label of the “Post-80s”, a term which has swiftly spread into the public consciousness through the reinforcement of the mass media. This label is appealing because of its simplicity to explain and interpret why social conflicts have led to waves of political mobilization and mass demonstrations in recent years. From a “generations” perspective, the “Post-80s Generation” would be regarded as the “source” of conflict.

### **2. Approach and Methodology**

The major research objectives are to compare and contrast the variations among the younger generations born between 1980 and 1995 in social and political attitudes, beliefs, postmaterialist values, orientations and behaviors. In addition, the post-70s cohort is also surveyed in order to capture the characteristics of those who are still regarded as “young” but not “green” in

terms of social exposure and working experience. It is also used as a control group or “baseline” to establish what characteristics, if any, are distinctive to the younger age group.

This study uses two approaches to the collection of relevant information and data. First, secondary analysis of existing survey data helps to unveil the characteristics of the younger generations born after 1980 and those born before then. Second, a telephone survey has been conducted to collect information pertaining to the social attitudes, beliefs, values, orientations and behaviors among Hong Kong citizens born between 1970 and 1995.

### **3. Findings from Secondary Data Analysis**

Data for secondary analysis come from three surveys: two telephone polls, one conducted in December 2009 and the other in January 2010, on 2012 constitutional reforms, and one community research project conducted in July 2008. We carried out statistical analysis on the three datasets to compare across cohorts their (1) political orientations, (2) social perceptions and values, (3) identity, and (4) life satisfaction. The findings do not exhibit consistent evidence to support the anecdotal generalization that the post-80s are more radical and discontented than other generations. We summarize the social attitudes of youth, especially those from the post-80s cohort as follows:

- less supportive of high speed rail budget
- more negative views of functional constituencies
- more inclined to support the demand for a timetable or roadmap for universal suffrage
- more supportive of resignation of Civic Party and LSD legislators and the

By-election, but NOT more inclined to recast their vote for candidates from these two parties

- identify more with LSD than the other cohorts, but are still more supportive of DP than LSD
- appear to be susceptible to issue-based mobilization based on “post-80” identities
- not more radical than the post-70s in disapproval of the 2012 constitutional reform bill
- not more skeptical than other cohorts with regard to progress in democratization under the 2012 constitutional reform
- more positive with regard to living standards
- more positive in believing hardworking will bring success
- more positive in planning for their own future
- more positive in accommodating economic restructuring
- more identified with Hong Kong
- lowest degree of sense of belonging to Hong Kong
- more satisfied than other cohorts with life in almost all domains

These results suggest that while there are some signs that the younger generation is more critical of the government and political establishment, this negative orientation is not fixed but is significantly influenced by political events and mobilization. The surge of negative perceptions among the younger cohort towards the political reform package after the anti-high speed rail movement is a clear illustration of this point. Negative sentiments among the younger cohorts, to the extent they exist, are not related to a more negative evaluation of their personal conditions. Even though young people are more critical of the government, they are in general more positive in evaluating their own conditions.

#### **4. Telephone Survey on Social Attitudes of the Youth Population in Hong Kong Conducted in May-June 2010**

The telephone survey was conducted from 24 May to 25 June 2010. The target respondents of the present study were Hong Kong youth population born in 1980 or after. Those born in 1970 or after were also surveyed as a reference group to compare and contrast with the younger sample. The finalized version of the questionnaire is attached in Appendix 1. A total of 2,003 respondents completed the survey: 1,108 (55.3%) are female and 895 (44.7%) male; 552 (27.6%) are post-90s, 667 (33.3%) post-80s, and 784 (39.1%) post-70s.

##### **4.1 Democratic Development and Environmental Conservation are Preferable**

A majority of respondents adopt postmaterialist positions on democracy and environmental conservation, and generational differences are small. The overwhelming support to postmaterialist orientations is found across generations. While we should not jump to the conclusion that most Hong Kongers are postmaterialists, we could say that for many Hong Kong people democracy and conservation are desirable value positions to adopt and profess.

##### **4.2 Civic Engagement and Seeking Political Information**

Anti-establishment sentiment is more readily manifest in attitudes than in actions. A majority of respondents have not engaged in any demonstration or rally since 1997, and mere 1.4% joined frequently. The participation pattern is very similar across the three generations although slightly higher percentages from the post-70s have engaged in these types of civic action. An overwhelming majority are aware of demonstrations or rallies to be organized.

The absence of any generational difference means that information seeking relating to civic actions is common among all respondents irrespective of the age factor.

Conventional mass media are still the major channels to receive information on civic actions to be organized. Television is the most common channel for 3 generations, while newspapers rank second for the post-70s and post-80s, but rank only third for the post-90s. Using the Internet or mobile phone SMS to receive information on civic actions is the second most popular channel for the post-90s, but ranks third for the post-80s and post-70s. The older generation thus has a notably different pattern of electronic communications usage than younger ones.

#### 4.3 Voting Behavior in the Legislative Council By-election

Held on 16 May 2010

Our survey result does not exactly match the interpretation found in the mass media that the By-election was much more appealing to the younger generation. More than half of respondents are registered voters eligible to vote in the By-election that took place on 16 May 2010. Eligible voters of the post-90s were the least mobilized to vote in the By-election, and the post-80s voters were the most mobilized. Despite the difference in voter turnout rates among generations, their choices are almost identical. An overwhelming majority of all generations voted for candidates from the Civic Party or League of Social Democrats (LSD). And the proportion of casting blank ballots is almost the same in all generations. The By-election was not particularly

appealing to the post-90s eligible voters. However, once they were mobilized, a majority of the post-90s supported the idea of the simulated referendum.

#### 4.4 Life Satisfaction

Results show that all generations are dissatisfied with the conditions of politics, economy and environmental conservation in Hong Kong. Although differences among generations exist, they are all barely visible. All generations evaluate their overall quality of life positively, with differences among generations, although statistically significant, quite small. All generations are slightly satisfied with their personal life, in contrast to negative evaluation of broader social conditions.

#### 4.5 Identity and Political Trust

An overwhelming majority of respondents in all generations explicitly identified themselves as Hong Kongers. Comparatively fewer respondents identified themselves as Chinese, although they are still in a majority. Not surprisingly, the percentage of the post-70s who identify themselves as Chinese is higher than that of the younger generations.

More respondents have trust in the Hong Kong SAR Government than Central Government. Trust in the Hong Kong SAR and Central Governments also differs significantly among generations. The post-80s are the most critical to the establishment. They have proportionately the lowest trust in the Hong Kong SAR Government and in the Central Government. The post-90s, on the other hand, have the noticeably highest proportion who trust in the Hong Kong SAR Government. The proportions trusting the Hong Kong and Central

Governments are similar among the post-70s.

#### 4.6 Education and Employment in the Mainland

Although respondents do not particularly favor a national identity or the Central Government, they are positive towards the idea of study or work in the Mainland. A majority of respondents accept the idea of pursuing further studies in the Mainland, and the tendency is about the same across generations. There is a similar popularity for the idea of working in China, with younger generations showing more enthusiasm than the post-70s. On the ideological level, our respondents, especially the younger generations, are not that positive towards establishing connections with the Mainland. When it comes to matters of personal life and development, however, the younger generations find it much more acceptable to have connections with the Mainland.

#### 4.7 Blocked Mobility of Youth?

Some recent observers of social unrest among youth suggest blocked upward mobility could be one of the factors leading to negative sentiments. Using three measures to probe youth perceptions of their opportunities for personal development in Hong Kong, this study found as follows. First, the post-80s and post-90s are more discontented with the opportunities available to their own age cohort than are the post-70s. Second, our findings are counter-intuitive to anecdotal observations that younger generations are supposedly more pessimistic about their personal development in the future. In fact, the post-80s and post-90s are more optimistic about their future development than the post-70s. Relatively fewer post-90s and post-80s than post-70s are expecting a worse future. Third, more respondents are satisfied than dissatisfied with the opportunities available for their personal development



in Hong Kong. Comparatively speaking, the post-80s are the least satisfied generation. The post-90s and post-70s report about the same level of satisfaction. These statistics do not offer strong enough evidence, however, to confirm the claim that blocked mobility pre-occupies youth perceptions. Nevertheless, neither satisfaction nor optimism is the prevalent sentiment among all generations.

## **5. Predictors of Youth Dissent in Hong Kong**

### **5.1 Social Attitudes of Dissent**

In this study, the extent of discontent is measured by 5 social attitudes: (1) whether or not respondents support the Legislative Council (LegCo) to approve the budget for the High Speed Rail in January 2010; (2) their evaluation towards LegCo members from Functional Constituencies after the High Speed Rail Budget was approved; (3) which side they support in various incidents of conflicts between HKSAR Government and concern groups on conservation issues; (4) their evaluation of democratic progress in Hong Kong since 1997; and (5) the political party they most support in Hong Kong. The following table summarizes the effect of various factors on dissenting social attitudes.

Table 1. Summary of Predictors of Dissenting Social Attitudes

	Generational difference: <i>younger</i>	Democratic and conservational value: <i>higher</i>	Postmaterialist value orientation: <i>higher</i>
Individual items of Social Attitudes			
NOT supporting High Speed Rail	✓	✓	✓
Negative evaluation towards Functional Constituencies	✓	✓	✓
Support environmental concern groups in conservation issues	✓	✓	✓
Consider democratic progress since 1997 too slow	✓ *	✓	✓
Democratic political affiliation	✓	✓	✓

✓ indicates predictor effect is statistically significant at probability less than 0.001, except with \* at 0.05 level.

Table 1 (cont'd)

	With local identity	NOT identified as Chinese	NOT trust HK SAR Government	NOT trust Central Government
Individual items of				
NOT supporting High Speed Rail	✗	✓	✓	✓
Negative evaluation towards Functional Constituencies	✗	✓	✓	✓
Support environmental concern groups in conservation issues	✗	✓	✓	✓
Consider democratic progress since 1997 too slow	✗	✓	✓	✓
Democratic political affiliation	✗	✓	✓	✓

✓ indicates predictor effect is statistically significant at probability less than 0.001.

✗ means no significant effect

## 5.2 Aggregate Measure of Dissenting Attitudes

Assessing individual items of dissenting social attitudes and political affiliation indicates how much discontent the youth population has towards the socio-political environment. An aggregate measure to summarize their discontent is created by counting how many of the following positions the respondents have expressed: (a) not supporting the High Speed Rail, (b) viewing Functional Constituencies negatively, (c) supporting environmental concern groups, (d) finding democratic progress too slow, and (e) having a democratic affiliation. The “baseline” post-70s are the least discontented generation; over 30% of them do not show any discontent. Both the post-90s and post-80s have an equal level of dissent. In general, the more dissenting respondents are male, born in Hong Kong or having lived here for 7 years or more, educated to a secondary educated or above, and students or economically active.

## 5.3 Demographic Profiles of the Strong Dissidents

Respondents are regarded as having strong level of dissenting attitudes if they have expressed 4 or 5 critical positions in the above-mentioned 5 socio-political issues. Among all respondents, a sizeable minority of 395 respondents (19.7%) are identified as having strong dissenting attitudes. A profile analysis of them reveals that the youth population holding strong dissenting attitudes share similar demographic characteristics:

- (1) not at the bottom layer economically (with median household income between \$10,000 and \$29,999),
- (2) attained tertiary education,
- (3) mostly born in Hong Kong, and

(4) with only few having experience of living overseas.

#### 5.4 Other Correlates of Dissenting Attitudes

Respondents perceiving limited opportunities are not visibly more dissenting than those perceiving better development opportunities, so we cannot conclude that perceptions of blocked mobility reinforce dissenting attitudes. The effects of quality of life on dissenting attitudes are similar. Respondents dissatisfied with life or health condition do not have visibly more dissenting attitudes than their satisfied counterparts. The same applies to unhappy respondents who are not more dissenting than happy ones. The findings do not support observations that dissatisfaction with life leads to dissent.

We have examined the effects of “Chinese patriotism” and “Trust in the Hong Kong SAR Government”. Both measures have a negative correlation with dissenting attitudes. For “Trust in the Hong Kong government”, a negative correlation means that the more trust there is, the less dissenting attitudes are. On the other hand, the more dissenting respondents are, the less their trust in the Hong Kong government. For “Chinese patriotism”, the more identified respondents are with China, the less dissenting their attitudes. Respondents with a stronger sense of dissent evaluate national identity and the Central Government more negatively.

#### 5.5 Postmaterialism and Dissent

The thesis of a cultural shift from materialism to postmaterialism has triggered a series of research studies in western societies since the 1970s that focus on how values affect and explain variations in perceptions of social, political, and economic conditions. It is one of the most influential

perspectives to describe and explain the effect of postmodernization on changes in values and perceptions in highly industrialized societies. Earlier empirical findings clearly revealed that Hong Kong people were basically materialist but also possessed partial but not fully developed postmaterialist values. In the present study, the generational difference in postmaterialist value orientation is found to be statistically significant, with the post-90s scoring the lowest and the post-80s the highest in measures of postmaterialist values. The postmaterialist value orientation has significant effects on social attitudes of dissent. The general pattern is that a stronger postmaterialist value orientation results in more critical perceptions of social and political issues.

#### 5.6 Multivariate Predictors of Dissenting Social Attitudes

To better gauge the combined predictive effects of demographic (structural) factors, postmaterialist value orientations, democratic and conservation inclination, identity, and political trust on dissenting attitudes, we have conducted multivariate regression analysis by using aggregate score on dissenting attitudes as the outcome.

The results show that the generations effect alone is minimal. Second, adding more demographic variables cannot account for the greater extent of dissenting attitudes. Hence, it implies that demographic characteristics are not effective predictors. Third, the predictive power is far more encouraging by combining factors of generations, postmaterialist values, democratic and conservation inclination, national identity, and trust in Central and as well as Hong Kong governments. The explanatory power is 8 times greater than the effect of demographic variables.

## **6. Conclusion**

This study starts out with the common perception that generation differences have become influential in the genesis of social discontents and even the emergence of protest movements against major public policies. From our secondary analysis of existing data we do not find consistent evidence to support this anecdotal generalization that the post-80s are more radical and discontented. Some differences in orientations indeed exist across cohorts, but the differences are slim and are not observable in some critical dimensions. While there are some signs that the younger generation is more critical of the government and political establishment, such oppositional attitude is not fixed but significantly influenced by political events and mobilization. More importantly, whatever negative sentiments exist among the younger cohorts, they do not appear to be related to unsatisfactory personal conditions. Even though young people are more critical of the government, they are in general more positive in evaluating their own conditions.

The various findings from the telephone survey specifically conducted for this study confirm that two younger generations are more critical of the establishment, and stronger believers in democracy and environmental conservation. The post-90s are expressing “radical” ideologies, comparable to if not more so, than those of the post-80s. An important question that follows is whether we could attribute the generational differences to the adolescent tendencies to rebel against authority or whether enduring transformation in social values has indeed occurred? The present study lacks the information to provide further answers to these puzzles. We have to wait for longitudinal research on the continuity and change of socio-political attitudes of those in the same cohort over their life course.

Some social observers have suggested three perspectives to account for social and political unrest among youth, namely, that discontents are a result of generational differences, that such differences could be traced to the lack of opportunities for social advancements among the younger generations, and that they are in general less satisfied with their personal life. When more factors are included in the analysis, the generations effect recedes to have minimal significance. We have also tested the second and third perspectives involving blocked upward mobility for youth, and their dissatisfaction with life. However, our findings do not support such claims.

In search of predictors of dissenting social attitudes in addition to generations effect, we use multivariate analysis to test the effectiveness of demographic (structural) factors, postmaterialist value orientations, democratic and conservation inclination, identity, and political trust. Results show that the demographic model is ineffective in explaining dissenting attitudes. Postmaterialist value orientations and other socio-political attitudes are powerful in accounting for dissenting attitudes. The generations effect becomes the weakest variable when its impact is assessed along with that of postmaterialist value orientations through multivariate analysis.

This study has revealed basically that radical and dissenting views show a systemic character in that they tend to cluster together. A person's dissenting view in one aspect may be correlated with values in other domains. There is evidence showing systemic relationships exist between value orientations and social unrest among youth irrespective of their demographic background. We do not know the causal effects yet, however. We should not subscribe uncritically to the common belief that many youngsters are driven to become discontented with the establishment because of dissatisfaction in their personal life. Blocked social mobility and dissatisfaction with aspects of their personal

life clearly have only a very slight effect on their negative orientations towards major policy decisions. In short, miserable youngsters do not necessarily become angry anti-establishment youngsters. Instead of assuming that young people are motivated by “negative” sentiments, we must accept the fact that many of the young people critical of the government are prompted by “positive” beliefs about themselves, the society, and the polity.

One of the major policy implications from our findings is that social unrest cannot be deduced from demographic background. We have to identify and understand the conditions and process of *how* these young people have come to acquire radical values and attitudes.

The second policy implication is that a sizeable minority of about 20% of youth are strong dissidents with an anti-establishment sentiment on almost every social or political issue. Officials involved in policy debates should expect that oppositional voices will not be silent and public actions characterized by confrontation and anti-establishment sentiments will probably occur. Policymakers may or may not respond to the sizeable minority views, but the choice made should be based on careful calculation but not paranoia.

This study is decidedly a preliminary investigation of a very complex problem, and only the socio-political *attitudes* of the younger population in general rather than their political *actions* are investigated. Further study on the “radical syndrome” and its determinants are perhaps called for before we could fully understand the rising tide of youth activism in public affairs. Nevertheless, the study has contributed by drawing a comprehensive picture of the value dispositions of the younger population in general, and reflecting the misinterpretation from common belief about youth. It also illustrates that a minority of the younger population harbor much discontent towards the



government and major policy decisions. In policy debates, public opinion will be heavily influenced by existing perceptions among the younger generation and policymakers are well advised to be aware of such perceptions. The presence of discontents and radical dispositions, if not actual radical behavior, would be an important parameter for policymakers to consider when riding over major policy debates.

## 摘要

### 1. 研究背景

過去兩年，大眾傳媒及公眾人士大為關注香港內部的代際分歧及矛盾。每逢有社會衝突事件發生而又以年青人為主導，傳媒往往理解為年青人不滿意社會現狀，並且由於他們自感長期缺乏向上流動機會而顯得焦慮不安，以致藉社會矛盾事件轉化為連串抗議行動。

傳媒揣測這些比較激進的年青人的行為動機，繼而歸納為「八十後」現象，泛指近年來發生多次市民與政府之間的尖銳社會衝突，可歸咎於上世紀八十年代或以後出生的本土年青一代做主導，而公眾人士亦輕易接納這個過於簡化的詮釋。自此，社會上連串的抗議示威事件，似乎用「八十後」就能夠輕鬆指出矛盾的源頭。

### 2. 研究方法

這次研究的主要目的是量度在 1980 年及以後出生的本土年青人，對社會及政治的看法、態度取向和相關行為，以及他們的後物質主義傾向，並分析這一代人是意見相近的還是差異比較大。另一方面，為對比「八十後」是否相異於其他年代的香港人，生於 1970 年至 1979 年的人亦成為是次研究的對象。這群「七十後」的受訪者，其實還算年青但又不是缺乏社會及工作經驗，因此他們成為本研究的基線，以對比「八十後」的相關態度、價值觀及行為。

是次研究主要透過兩個途徑搜集資料作分析之用。首先，再行檢視以往多個問卷調查的資料，分析當中年青受訪者的特徵，並著重分析代際之間是否存在差異。第二個途徑是進行一項電話調查，根據本研究的特定目標，調查 15 至 40 歲年青人的社會態度、信念、價值取向和行爲。

### 3. 分析以往問卷調查資料的結果

再分析的三項問卷調查，包括兩個關於香港 2012 年政制改革的電話調查，分別於 2009 年 12 月及 2010 年 1 月進行；第三項則是於 2008 年 7 月在香港兩個社區進行的社會調查。重新分析這三項問卷調查資料的目標是比較「七十後」和「八十後」之異同，重點在於他們的政治取向、對社會的觀感、價值觀、身份認同，及生活滿意程度。分析結果並不全面符合傳媒及社會大眾對「八十後」的印象，即是認為「八十後」較其他年齡群更爲激進或對社會更感不滿。分析結果顯示「八十後」具有以下與別不同的特徵：

- 較爲反對通過撥款興建高鐵
- 對立法會功能組別持比較負面看法
- 較爲傾向要求爲香港政制改革定出普選時間表或路線圖
- 較支持公民黨及社民連提出的「立法會議員五區請辭」及舉行立法會補選，但不一定會於補選投票時再支持兩黨的候選人
- 雖然較其他年齡群更爲支持社民連，但支持民主黨的比例仍多於支持社民連
- 較易受到打著「八十後」旗幟所動員而支持社會運動
- 並不比「七十後」更爲激烈否定 2012 年政制改革方案

- 並不比其他年齡群更為懷疑 2012 政制改革方案當中的民主進步成份
- 對個人生活處境持較為正面評價
- 較為相信勤奮帶來成功
- 較傾向為自己計劃將來
- 較能應付經濟轉型
- 更認同香港身份
- 但對香港的歸屬感較低
- 感到生活各方面的滿意程度較高

分析結果顯示「八十後」年青人對政府及建制持有較為批判的立場。然而這些態度並非固定不變，而是受到政治議題及社會動員情況所影響。其中一個例子是當高鐵撥款獲立法會通過後，年青人普遍對 2012 年政制改革方案持相當負面的評價。這些異議態度並非源於較差的個人生活條件，反而他們對自己生活處境的評價較為正面。

#### **4. 2010 年 5 月至六月進行之電話調查分析結果**

電話調查於 2010 年 5 月 24 日至 6 月 25 日進行，成功訪問了 2,003 名於 1970 年至 1995 年出生的香港市民，問卷題目載於附件一。受訪者當中有 1,180 名女性（佔 55.3%）及 895 名男性（44.7%）。三個不同出生世代的分佈是：552 名「九十後」（生於 1990-1995 年、佔 27.6%）、667 名「八十後」（1980-1989 年、33.3%）及 784 名「七十後」（1970-1979 年、39.1%）。重點分析結果如下。

#### 4.1 支持民主發展及環境保育

大部份受訪者傾向「後物質主義」立場支持民主發展及環境保育，而不同出生世代之間的差異不大。「後物質主義」傾向普遍存在於三個出生世代的受訪者，雖然還未能從中推論大部份香港年青人都具備「後物質主義」精神，但是他們不會掩飾追求民主及環保的價值觀。

#### 4.2 公民參與和獲取政治訊息

反抗政治建制的情緒表達，遠較付諸行動來得劇烈。大部份的受訪者自香港回歸後都未曾參與過任何示威或遊行，而只有 1.4% 受訪者表示常常參與這類行動。三個出生世代的受訪者都不熱衷參與實際行動，當中只有「七十後」的參與率稍為高於另外兩個世代。雖然他們參與示威遊行的比例很低，但是並非不聞不問，反而大部份都知道有關行動的訊息。知悉政治活動訊息的受訪者比例不受年齡所影響。

傳統的大眾傳媒仍然是受訪者獲取政治行動訊息的主要渠道，三個出生世代同樣透過電視接收最為普遍，報章則是「七十後」及「八十後」當中的次位，而「九十後」則透過互聯網或手機短訊作為接收訊息的第二位，可見電子訊息是最年青一代的重要溝通媒介。

### 4.3 有關 2010 年 5 月 16 日之立法會補選投票情況

雖然大眾傳媒把 2010 年 5 月的立法會補選的「變相公投」議題，視為對年青選民的吸引力最大，但是電話調查的分析結果顯示不一定如此。大約一半的受訪者是登記選民，「八十後」無疑是最響應動員而去投票的一代，但是更為年青的「九十後」選民受訪者卻是投票率最低。無論投票率高低，有投票的受訪者，不論出生世代都持相近的投票意向，即大部份人都把選票投向公民黨或社民連的候選人。另一方面，三個出生世代投白票的比例亦相近，顯示年齡不影響投票取向。雖然最年青的「九十後」並不熱烈響應參與補選投票，但是只要他們有投票，大部份都是為了支持「變相公投」這個議題。

### 4.4 生活滿意程度

不同世代的受訪者都不滿意於香港的政治、經濟和環境保育情況。雖然世代之間的不滿程度有參差，但是相差極少。跟評價社會狀況相反，受訪者都普遍滿意他們的生活質素，而代際差異亦是微不足道。換句話說，受訪者不滿意社會狀況，但並非同時間埋怨個人的生活水平或質素。

### 4.5 身份與政治認同

不論年齡，絕大部份受訪者都認同自己的「香港人」身份，而認同「中國人」身份的比例，略為不及「香港人」，但仍然受到多數人所認同。毫不意外，比較年長的「七十後」認同中國人身份的比例高於其他兩個世代。

政治認同方面，信任香港特區政府的受訪者比例高於信任中央政府，

而世代之間亦見差異。「八十後」既然最反抗政治建制，他們對特區政府及中央政府的信任程度，是三個世代之中最低。「九十後」信任特區政府的比例則是三個世代的受訪者中最高，而「七十後」信任兩個政府的比例相近。

#### 4.6 到內地升學或就業

雖然受訪者並非一面倒認同國家或信任中央政府，但是對回內地升學或就業持積極態度，他們過半數接受自己到國內升學或就業。三個世代之間的差異不明顯，但以「八十後」最為熱衷到國內就業，「九十後」次之。雖然年青人在政治建制上較抗拒與國內建立連繫，但關乎個人前途及發展時，反而願意積極考慮內地的發展空間及機會。

#### 4.7 年青人缺乏向上流動機會嗎？

近年主流社會輿論把年青人對社會的不滿，歸咎於他們因為缺乏向上流動機會而積怨所轉化。就此疑問，本研究嘗試以三方面理解年青人對個人發展機會的評價。第一，「八十後」及「九十後」確實較「七十後」更為不滿目前香港給予他們所屬世代的發展機會。第二，雖然較年青的兩代更為不滿現況，但是他們卻並非如社會輿論所理解般悲觀。相反，「八十後」及「九十後」其實對自己的前途更為樂觀，而「七十後」則相對較多人表示未來會轉差。第三，關於個人在香港得到的發展機會，三個世代感到滿意的人多於感到不滿的人，當中「八十後」的滿意比例較另外兩個世代為低。以上三項結果，顯然不足以支持輿論認為年青人因不滿缺乏向上流動機會而積怨並轉化成為不滿社會現狀。

## 5. 與異議態度相關的各項因素

### 5.1 預測異議者對社會政治議題的態度

是次研究以受訪者對五項社會政治議題的評價，來測量他們對整體社會狀況的不滿及異議程度。五項事件包括：1. 是否支持立法會於 2010 年 1 月通過興建高鐵撥款；2. 立法會通過高鐵撥款後對功能組別議員的評價；3. 過去多次政府與環保團體的矛盾當中，傾向支持那一方；4. 對香港自 1997 年回歸以來民主進展的評價；5. 最支持香港那一個政黨。這些異議態度，嘗試透過多項因素來預測，包括：不同出生年代、民主及環境保育意識、「後物質主義」傾向、認同香港身份、認同國家身份、信任特區政府、及信任中央政府。「表一」總括五項社會政治議題與各項因素的相關程度。

表一、異議態度及相關因素

社會政治議題	出生世代 不同： 愈年青	民主及保育 意識： 愈高	「後物質主 義」傾向： 愈強
1. 不支持興建高鐵款	✓	✓	✓
2. 對立法會功能組別持負面態度	✓	✓	✓
3. 支持環保團體對各項環保議題 的立場	✓	✓	✓
4. 自 1997 年以來民主發展太慢	✓ *	✓	✓
5. 支持民主黨派	✓	✓	✓

✓ 表示相關性達到統計學上 0.001 的顯著度；有 \* 者代表顯著度是 0.05.



表一（續）

社會政治議題	認同	不認同	不信任	不信任
	香港身份	國家身份	特區政府	中央政府
1. 不支持興建高鐵撥款	✘	✓	✓	✓
2. 對立法會功能組別持負面態度	✘	✓	✓	✓
3. 支持環保團體對各項環保議題的立場	✘	✓	✓	✓
4. 自 1997 年以來民主發展太慢	✘	✓	✓	✓
5. 支持民主黨派	✘	✓	✓	✓

✓ 表示相關性達到統計學上 0.001 的顯著度

✘ 表示統計學上不相關

## 5.2 建構「累積異議指標」

根據上述「表一」五項社會政治議題的取態，大致上可以看到年青人對社會政治狀況的不滿程度。各項議題其實不是完全獨立出現，不滿情緒可能會累積起來，因此需要建構一個指標來量度累積起來的不滿情緒。對下列五項議題所表達的異議次數總和，代表累積程度有多少：

1. 不支持興建高鐵撥款；
2. 對立法會功能組別持負面態度；
3. 支持環保團體對各項環保議題的立場
4. 自 1997 年以來民主發展太慢
5. 支持民主黨派

「累積異議指標」的分析結果顯示，「七十後」對社會政治狀況的異議

程度最低，超過 30%的「七十後」在五項事件之中沒有表達任何不滿情緒，而其餘兩代年青人的累積異議程度相近。總括來說，累積異議較多的受訪者特徵是：男性、在香港出生、居港七年或以上、中學教育程度或以上、在學或在職。

### 5.3 強烈異議者的人口特徵

在上述五項社會政治議題中，對其中四或五項都表達不滿者，可算是累積了強烈程度的異議態度。這批強烈異議者共有 395 人，佔受訪者當中的 19.7%，雖然是少數，但比例絕不容忽視。分析發現這批強烈異議者具備以下的人口特徵：

- (1) 經濟方面並非處於最底層，他們每月家庭總收入的中位數是港幣 \$10,000-\$29,999；
- (2) 專上教育程度；
- (3) 大部份於香港出生；及
- (4) 只有少數人有在外國生活經驗。

### 5.4 與異議態度相關的其他因素

雖然社會上有輿論認為年青人由於缺乏向上流動機會而對社會產生並累積不滿，但是分析結果不支持這個意見。不論是認為自己缺乏發展機會，還是將有更好發展機會的受訪者，他們的「累積異議指標」都大致相同。此外，對個人整體生活或健康不滿意，或是感覺生活不開心的人，都不會轉化成爲對社會狀況更添不滿。換句話說，就算他們對自己生活有種種的負面評價，但「累積異議指標」並不高於其他對生活有正面評價的人。

與「累積異議指標」相關的是國家身份認同、信任中央政府，及信任特區政府。愈是認同國家身份、愈信任中央和香港政府，累積異議便愈低。相反，「累積異議指標」愈高者，愈不信任香港和中央政府、愈不認同國家身份。

## 5.5 後物質主義與異議態度

自上世紀七十年代起，國外學界便開始對文化價值觀的轉變進行連串研究，檢視由「物質主義」轉為「後物質主義」的趨勢，如何影響到對社會、政治、經濟狀況的評價。「後物質主義」是其中一個最具影響力的觀點去分析後現代高度工業化社會中的價值觀轉變。上世紀九十年代有研究報告指出香港的主流價值觀仍然是物質主義，但是後物質主義價值開始浮現。今次研究發現，不同出生世代的後物質主義傾向在統計學上有顯著差異，「八十後」的傾向最強，「九十後」則最弱。除世代有別外，異議態度亦與後物質主義傾向有顯著相關。整體來說，受訪者的後物質主義傾向愈強，他們對社會政治議題批判得愈激烈。

## 5.6 與異議態度相關的因素作多變項迴歸分析

以上分析發現不同因素都與受訪者的「累積異議指標」高低有關，為找出當中最具影響力的因素，需要進行多變項迴歸分析，包括：人口特徵、後物質主義價值觀、民主與環境保育意識、國家身份認同及對政府的信任。分析結果顯示，出生世代對「累積異議指標」有影響但是最弱，而加進其他人口特徵對預測受訪者的「累積異議指標」並無幫助。另一方面，把出生世代、後物質主義價值、民主與環境保育意識、國家身份認同及對中港兩個政府的信任等因素組合起來，更能有效預測「累積異議指標」。

## 6. 結論

近來社會上普遍以世代論解釋「八十後」年青人對社會的諸多不滿，以至轉化為連串社會運動反對政府不同政策。經過分析手頭上以往多項問卷調查的資料，卻未有發現一致的證據證明「八十後」比較其他世代更為對社會不滿或激進。社會政治事件確曾引起不同世代之間的分歧，當中較年青的對政府及建制持更加批判的態度。然而，這些對抗行為並非一定出現，要視乎每項議題是否引起足夠社會爭議，讓隨後的社會運動得以成功動員某個世代成為主力。此外，就算年青人對社會狀況有不滿，都不是源於個人不理想的生活處境所引致。對政府縱有反抗和不滿，年青人還是抱正面態度評價個人處境。

為探討年青人的社會態度，這次研究進行了一項電話調查。分析結果顯示「八十後」及「九十後」較「七十後」更反抗建制、更支持民主及環境保育，而「九十後」的激進程度絕不比「八十後」遜色。至於這些激進態度是一貫年青人反叛行為，還是反映他們的價值觀出現了深刻變化，有待進行長期追蹤研究才会有答案。

年青人對社會及政治狀況表達不滿及對抗，除了「世代論外」，社會上還有另外兩個流行論述，就是他們缺乏上進機會（「缺乏機會論」），以及不滿足於個人生活處境（「生活不滿足論」），經累積轉化為對社會及政治狀況產生對抗情緒。經分析電話調查的資料，當中發現只有「世代論」對激動態度有少許解釋能力，至於「缺乏機會論」及「生活不滿足論」則沒有效果。

要預測年青人對社會及政治狀況的異議程度，需要進行多變項迴歸分

析，把一些結構性因素及社會價值觀等綜合檢視，當中包括：人口特徵、後物質主義價值觀、民主與環境保育意識、國家身份認同及對政府的信任。人口特徵的解釋能力在統計學上不顯著，其他的價值觀及社會政治意識則能夠有效預測異議程度，而世代之間的差異，在統計學上是明顯的，但效果微弱。

年青人對社會及建制有不滿及對抗，具有互相連結性質，即是對某個議題跟主流論述有異議，便會引伸至其他議題都會出現同樣的評價及對抗行爲。這樣有系統的連結，並不會因不同的人口特徵背景而有所分別。因此，不宜輕率採用「世代論」、「缺乏機會論」、「生活不滿足論」去解釋年青人的異議態度及行爲，更不宜把他們視爲反建制的「憤怒青年」。相反，應該把年青人反建制的態度理解爲他們對個人、社會及政治狀況抱有正面積極的信念，希望改革而非破壞社會。

是項研究的結果，對制定政策有以下的啓示：

第一、不能夠根據人口特徵認定年青人必然對社會及政治狀況有不滿情緒，「世代論」並非有效的解釋。要理解爲何總是有一群年青人出現對抗行爲，就要徹底了解他們產生激進理念、態度及行爲的過程和條件。

第二、雖然持強烈異議態度的受訪者只有約 20%，但是把結果推論到整個香港社會，有近五份一的年青人對每項社會或政治議題的反應都是比較激進及對抗建制的話，政府官員在制定政策的過程中，就要預期必然會有一群人極力反對任何政府建議。面對這些反對聲音，制定政策時可以照顧他們的意見，或者完全不接納他們，但無論是採取那種溝通策略，都應該經過深思熟慮，而非源於對年青異議者的偏見而作出反應。

由於年青人的激進行為涉及多方面的複雜因素，是項研究的目標是進行一次初步調查，嘗試了解年青人的政治態度和社會價值觀，而非他們具體的激進政治行動。要進一步理解他們參與激進政治運動的動機、理念和組織策略等，就要透過日後不同的研究才有答案。然而，是次研究已經勾劃出年青人的政治意識及社會價值觀，指出社會主流意見對年青人的薄弱解釋能力以至誤解。年青人當中一小部份對政府的重要政策建議幾乎是每項必反的，政策制定者若要主導公眾參與政策辯論的方向，必須從一開始就正視這些年青人的激進意見及行為，以免到後期變得要被動回應。

## **I. Background of the Study**

In the past two years, generational differences and conflicts have evoked considerable interest from the mass media and the public. Most discussions of the “generations thesis” have originated from a popular book entitled “Four Generations of Hong Kong People” written by a professor of sociology in Hong Kong (Lui, 2007). Since then, various commentators have borrowed or interpreted ideas from that book in an eclectic fashion to “explain” social issues relating to the younger generation in Hong Kong. Especially when incidents of social unrest visibly involve the younger generation, the mass media usually cite anecdotal evidence to argue that “generational conflicts” are operative. In that narrative, the beliefs and actions of the younger generation are interpreted to be a consequence of frustration caused by the limited opportunity to move up the social ladder or from having their upward social mobility blocked. The bulk of anecdotal observations and interpretations have gradually crystallized around the label of the “post-80s”. This term has swiftly spread into the public consciousness through the reinforcement of the mass media.

The prevailing tendency to latch onto this view of the dissenting younger generation as the “post-80s” striving for personal upward mobility is understandable in terms of the appeal of simple causal explanations. The interpretation and explanation of the recent social conflicts leading to waves of political mobilization and mass demonstration are thus viewed through the lens of a cohort perspective. On the other hand, the simplicity of the “generations thesis” has the disadvantage of obscuring more significant “deep-rooted contradictions” operating behind social conflicts. For example, the strong advocacy of heritage conservation over urban development has been led by young persons in their early 20s. Based on this fact, it is tempting at first glance to regard the the so-called “post-80s Generation” as the “source” of

conflict. However, if the issues are analyzed from a wider socio-political context, other factors should be more relevant. Among possible sources of influence, this study explores the conflict between materialist and postmaterialist worldviews, instead of restricting analysis to presumed tensions between “older” and “younger” generations. Seen in this light, the current preoccupation with the “generations thesis” may result in overshadowing more fundamental explanations in terms of “deep-rooted contradictions” in Hong Kong.

To investigate the generations thesis and other possible sources of influence on emergent social conflicts and tensions, this study seeks answers to four main questions:

- (1) Does the younger generation have unique socio-political orientations vis-à-vis older cohorts? Are there any distinctive variations in the values and orientation *within* this younger generation?
- (2) How does the younger generation perceive its own position and opportunities in the socio-economic system, and in particular the chances for improving its social and economic status?
- (3) Does the younger generation exhibit a distinctive set of postmaterialist values?
- (4) What are the socio-demographic and biographical factors that could account for variations in socio-political orientations among the younger generation?



## **II. Approach and Methodology**

This study uses a quantitative approach to gather the required information on the young population of Hong Kong. The main age cohort under study includes those born in the years between 1980 and 1995, that is, those aged 15-29 as of the year 2010, but those born in the 1970s are also included as a reference group to compare with the so-called “post-80s” group. This study should be considered exploratory in nature because of the tentative nature of many of the research questions and tools, and the limitations of relying on the telephone survey method. It will, we hope, pave the way for a more comprehensive study of the issue of generational differences and how they are related to social actions in Hong Kong.

One major focus of our research is on the variations among the younger generation (i.e. those born between 1980 and 1995) in their social attitudes, beliefs, postmaterialist values, orientations and behaviors. The target age cohorts under study include not only the post-80s, but also those born in the 1970s in order to capture the characteristics of those who are still regarded as “young” but not “green” in terms of social exposure and working experience. It is also used as a control group or “baseline” to establish what characteristics, if any, are distinctive to the post-80s group.

Relevant information and data reported in this study come from two main sources. First, we undertook a secondary analysis of data from existing surveys to help unveil the characteristics of the post-80s generation and those born before then. The results are intended to lay the groundwork for preliminary answers to the relevant questions, and in particular to establish whether there are differences within and among various cohorts. Second, a telephone survey has been conducted to collect data pertaining to general social

attitudes, beliefs, values, orientations and behaviors among Hong Kong citizens born in 1970 and afterwards. Attitudes towards the recent social events involving the so-called “post-80s” generation will also be surveyed.

In this final report, we first present our secondary analysis based on existing survey data from various local studies to illustrate the social attitudes among the post-80s generation and those born before then. We then report and discuss the findings from our telephone survey on “Social Attitudes of the Youth Population in Hong Kong.”

The part on secondary data analysis helps provides a rough overall account of the nature of youth attitudes in different periods of time in recent years. For such secondary analysis, we have gone beyond simply re-interpreting already published findings. The Principal Investigator has access to three recent survey datasets, thus enabling a re-analysis of these datasets in relationship to youth attitudes. Readers are reminded that these secondary datasets have their limitations arising from the lack of common themes, or identical sampling frames, and were conducted at different times. In order to conduct re-analysis as rigorously and comparable as possible, our strategy is to include and group respondents born in 3 different decades, i.e. the post-70s born during the 1970s, the post-80s (born during the 1980s), and the post-90s, in each available dataset. The re-analysis is intended to produce some basic understandings of the younger generations (the post-80s and post-90s) and also an overview of some of the value differences between the younger generation and those born earlier. The three recent surveys that have been re-analyzed include a face-to-face questionnaire survey conducted in Tin Shui Wai and Sham Shui Po districts in 2008, and two telephone surveys on attitudes towards constitutional reform conducted from December 2009 to February 2010. In the re-analysis, we have compared across cohorts their (1) political orientations, (2) social perceptions

and values, (3) identity, and (4) life satisfaction.


### **III. Findings from Secondary Data analysis**

#### **3.1 Political Orientations: Before and After the Legislative Council Passed the High Speed Rail Budget**

The Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies conducted two telephone surveys on the 2012 constitutional reform. The first survey was done between 22 to 30 December 2009 (December-survey), and the second from 28 January to 4 February 2010 (January-survey). The target respondents in both surveys were Hong Kong citizens aged 18 and older. The sample size was 1,007 in the first survey and 1,008 in the second.

The results of the surveys, shown in Figure 3.1, do not indicate the post-80s respondents to be the most radical and resistant to the government's proposed 2012 constitutional reform package. In the December-survey, the *post-80s were even the most supportive (55.1%) among all cohorts*. The post-70s in the December-survey were the most unsupportive, showing only 46% support and 38% not support. In the January survey, after the mass demonstrations opposing the high speed rail budget in January 2010, however, the post-80s stand out to be the most unsupportive of the constitutional reform package (35%). On the other hand, 53% of the post-80s still supported the constitutional reform package, two percentage points less than in the December-survey but still the second highest level of support among all cohorts. The least supportive were the pre-60s (45.6%).

Figure 3.1 Do respondents support LegCo Councillors to pass the 2012 Constitutional Reform Bill?



The League of Social Democrats (LSD) is said to be popular among the post-80s generation in Hong Kong. One indirect indicator of support for the LSD is whether or not respondents supported the resignation of the legislators from the Civic Party and LSD to force a de facto referendum on universal suffrage. Figure 3.2 below shows that post-80s were the most likely among all cohorts to approve resignation and By-election. However, it should also be noted that more than 50% of post-80s in both surveys did not support the resignation and By-election. Nevertheless, as Table 3.3 shows, the post-80s were significantly more likely than other cohorts to report they planned to vote in the By-election.

Figure 3.2 Do respondents support the resignation of the 5 legislators from Civic Party and League of Social Democrats and their running for re-election in a By-election to force a de facto referendum on universal suffrage?




Table 3.3 Would respondent vote in By-election (January-survey only)?

	Post-80s	Post-70s	Post-60s	Pre-60s
	%	%	%	%
No	23.7	37.5	43.5	44.2
Yes	63.3	40.5	42.5	40.4
Not yet decided	11.5	17.3	11.3	12.5
Depends	1.4	4.8	2.7	2.8
Total	99.9	100.1	100.0	99.9

p < 0.001

Table 3.4 illustrates more directly that the post-80s were not necessarily most supportive of the LSD or the Civic Party since a higher percentage of the post-70s (39.4%) than post-80s (37.4%) reported they would vote for the Civic Party/LSD.

Table 3.4 If they vote, would respondents vote for candidates from Civic Party or LSD?

	Post-80s	Post-70s	Post-60s	Pre-60s
	%	%	%	%
No	20.6	18.3	24.8	29.3
Yes	37.4	39.4	36.2	35.6
Not yet decided / Depends	42.1	42.3	39.0	35.1
Total	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0

p > 0.05

Table 3.5 Political party most supported in January-survey and change from the December-survey

	Post-80s	Post-70s	Post-60s	Pre-60s
	%	%	%	%
Democratic Party (DP)	13.1	14.7	11.0	10.6
<i>(Change from December-survey)</i>	<i>-4.3</i>	<i>7.5</i>	<i>-2.8</i>	<i>-5.2</i>
Civic Party (CP)	6.8	7.3	7.2	7.6
<i>(Change)</i>	<i>-1.6</i>	<i>-4.3</i>	<i>-3.8</i>	<i>1.2</i>
League of Social Democrats (LSD)	11.0	3.4	3.8	1.6
<i>(Change)</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>-2.7</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0.8</i>
Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) / Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU)	5.8	11.3	10.5	15.5
<i>(Change)</i>	<i>-2.7</i>	<i>6.3</i>	<i>-3.8</i>	<i>-2.5</i>
Pan-democrats	9.9	10.2	6.2	6.3
<i>(Change)</i>	<i>-1.1</i>	<i>-8.2</i>	<i>-2.8</i>	<i>-1.5</i>
Liberal Party (LP) / Pro-establishment	2.6	3.4	2.9	3.8
<i>(Change)</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1.2</i>	<i>0.5</i>	<i>2.4</i>
Independent / Neutral	50.8	49.7	58.4	54.6
<i>(Change)</i>	<i>7.6</i>	<i>0.3</i>	<i>11.7</i>	<i>4.8</i>
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 3.5 reports the percentages of respondents' most supporting party in the January-survey, and also the change from the December-survey. Slightly more of the post-80s (13.1%) supported the Democratic Party than the LSD (11.0%) in the January survey. This pattern is also found among the post-70s and post-60s but with a significantly wider gap between support for the DP versus the LSD. However, the mass demonstrations over the high speed rail budget in January 2010 could have impacted on the political orientation of the post-80s. In the January-survey, the post-80s reported the largest drop in support to the Democratic Party among all political parties. On the other hand, the LSD had captured more support from the post-80s, and it was the only party to receive increased support from this cohort. Apart from the pre-60s who supported most the DAB/FTU, the DP was most popular in 3 cohorts born after the 1960s.

Comparing these two surveys with our latest conducted in May to June 2010 (May-survey) shows that political party identification has become more attenuated. While about 50% of respondents in the January and December surveys preferred a neutral or independent political affiliation, this proportion rose to about 70% in the May-survey. The sharp increase in the proportion adopting a "neutral" position means all political parties have been losing support. One explanation could be that during the period when the May-survey was conducted, the situation regarding the 2012 constitutional reform of Hong Kong changed dramatically. The acrimonious arguments and irresolvable conflicts that surfaced within the pan-democratic political camp could have weakened support from the public.

How radical was the post-80s cohort in response to the high speed rail budget? Table 3.6 illustrates their attitudes were significantly different from



the other 3 cohorts. A majority of the post-80s were against the high speed rail budget while a majority of the other 3 cohorts supported it. Over time, the sentiment of against the high speed rail diminishes. The proportion of the post-70s against the high speed rail drops from 40% (January 2010) to 31.6% (May 2010), and for the post-80s from 53% to 44.4%. As this happened, the proportions from both these cohorts who support the high speed rail increased after February 2010. This suggests that anti-establishment sentiment can sometimes fluctuate.

Table 3.6 Did respondents support LegCo's approval of the budget for the high speed rail (January-survey)

	Post-80s	Post-70s	Post-60s	Pre-60s
	%	%	%	%
Don't support / Strongly don't support	53.0	40.0	34.4	24.0
Support / Strongly support	42.0	57.4	59.6	63.4
Don't know	5.0	2.6	6.0	12.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

p < 0.001

This difference in attitudes towards the high speed rail budget was not reproduced, however, in answers to a question asking respondents for their evaluation of the functional constituencies in the Legislature Council. Table 3.7 shows that after LegCo approved the high speed rail budget, negative evaluation towards functional constituencies prevailed over positive evaluation in the 3 cohorts born after the 1960s. Although the pre-60s cohort was not as negatively inclined, some in this group nevertheless did express a worsening evaluation, as found among the other 3 cohorts, towards functional constituencies after LegCo approved the high speed rail budget. Like the case of the anti-high speed rail sentiment, the negative evaluation of functional

constituencies drops slightly over time. In the May-survey, about 44% of the post-70s and 54% of the post-80s cohorts evaluated functional constituencies poorly.

Table 3.7 Evaluation of functional constituencies after LegCo approved the high speed rail budget (January-survey)

	Post-80s	Post-70s	Post-60s	Pre-60s
	%	%	%	%
<b>Worsens</b>	<b>25.3</b>	<b>22.0</b>	<b>20.2</b>	16.2
<b>Remains poor</b>	<b>32.3</b>	<b>28.3</b>	<b>25.7</b>	13.6
Becomes better	4.5	6.8	6.9	<b>7.6</b>
Remains good	11.1	12.0	11.9	<b>16.7</b>
No definite ideas	24.2	27.7	32.6	30.6
Don't know	2.5	3.1	2.8	15.4
Total	99.9	99.9	100.1	100.1

p < 0.001

## 3.2 A Study of Public Housing Residents from Tin Shui Wai and Sham Shui Po: Two Lower Socio-Economic Status Communities

### 3.2.1 Political Orientations

In July 2008, the Central Policy Unit commissioned a community research project to the Principal Investigator. The project included a household questionnaire survey in Tin Shui Wai (TSW) and Sham Shui Po (SSP) districts. These two districts recorded the lowest median household income in Hong Kong, and hence were regarded as the lowest socio-economic status (SES). The survey was administered between July and September, 2008, using a face-to-face interview format. A total of 653 public housing residents aged 18 to 60 (316 in TSW and 337 in SSP.) were successfully interviewed in the survey.

Tables 3.8 to 3.10 present findings from the survey regarding the political orientation and actions of the respondents. Some 75% of all cohorts in TSW and SSP were not interested or not very interested in politics. However, the, pre-60s cohort was slightly more interested in politics (28.3%) than the other cohorts, followed by the post-80s (25.6%). However, the difference across cohorts was not statistically significant. To tap their political activism, we asked how often they had engaged in two common political activities: signing petitions, and joining a demonstration or sit-in strike. Signing petitions demands minimal involvement of participants, especially when organized on the community level. As shown in Table 3.9, the younger cohorts were less active than their older counterpart in signing petitions. More than 60% of post-70s and post-80s did not sign any in the previous year, while more than 20% of pre-70s did sign. The difference between younger and older cohorts in this regard was found to be statistically significant. Joining a demonstration or sit-in strike would require more time and cost. Not surprisingly, this type of political participation was unpopular among all cohorts; over 90% in each cohort did not join any demonstration or sit-in protest in the previous year. In brief, coming from less well-off communities is not necessarily highly correlated with activism in political attitudes and participation.

Table 3.8 Are respondents interested in politics?

	Post-80s	Post-70s	Post-60s	Pre-60s
	%	%	%	%
Not interested / Not at all interested	74.4	79.5	77.4	71.7
Interested / Very Interested	25.6	20.5	22.6	28.3
Total	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0

p > 0.05

Table 3.9 How often in the past year did respondents engage in signing petitions?

	Post-80s	Post-70s	Post-60s	Pre-60s
	%	%	%	%
None	60.9	69.5	56.7	58.7
Seldom	24.8	14.4	17.1	11.7
Occasionally	12.0	14.4	<b>22.1</b>	<b>25.1</b>
Frequently	2.3	1.7	<b>4.1</b>	<b>4.5</b>
Total	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

p < 0.01

Table 3.10 How often in the past year did respondents join in demonstration / sit-in protests?

	Post-80s	Post-70s	Post-60s	Pre-60s
	%	%	%	%
None	96.2	95.8	96.3	93.9
Seldom	3.0	3.4	1.4	2.2
Occasionally	0.8	0.8	1.8	3.9
Frequently	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0
Total	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0

p > 0.05

### 3.2.2 Social Perceptions and Values

The 2008 community survey also investigated respondents' social perceptions and values. Table 3.11 lists their evaluation of 12 items, in the form of statements, with ratings on a 5-point scale (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree). The first two items reflect their perception of the role of government, followed by 4 items concerned with social values and the remaining 6 with their personal conditions. Higher scores indicate agreeing more to the statements. Except for the last 2 items on personal conditions, all differences in mean scores across cohorts are found to be statistically significant.

With respect to the first two statements, the post-80s were more skeptical than the other cohorts of the government's role in catering for the needs of citizens (3.66) and the appropriateness of the government's decisions made (2.5). Their evaluation of the latter statement indicates they hold a relatively more negative perception of government decisions.

With respect to the social values, compared to older generations, the post-80s consistently demonstrated more progressive attitudes towards social values. On one hand, the post-80s were quite similar to the post-60s and post-70s in terms of level of agreement with the statement about working hard bringing success. On the other hand, they had lower percentages agreeing with statements about the existence of equality of opportunity, about social security acting as a disincentive to work, and about poverty being caused by personal factors.

Regarding responses to statements about their personal situations, the orientations of the post-80s were in sharp contrast with those of the pre-60s. The former had higher mean scores than the latter in terms of desirability of empowering oneself to meet economic challenges and planning for the future, and were also less likely to expect a declining living standard or to feel they would be unjustly rewarded for their effort. The pre-60s by contrast were generally more pessimistic about their living standard in future, perhaps because they believed they were less able to adapt to the challenges of economic restructuring and to plan accordingly for the future. This contrast between younger and older cohorts suggests that despite coming from less well-off communities, the post-80s cohort hasn't given up hope of improving their situation and material conditions.

Table 3.11 Mean scores on measures of social perceptions and values

(1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree)

	Post-80s	Post-70s	Post-60s	Pre-60s
1. Government should pay more attention to the needs of my social class *	<b>3.66</b>	3.80	3.88	3.86
2. Government always makes the right decisions *	<b>2.50</b>	2.83	2.76	2.74
3. Hardworking brings success in HK *	<b>3.57</b>	3.52	3.54	3.32
4. There are equal opportunities in Hong Kong for people whatever their social origins	<b>3.40</b>	3.64	3.58	3.56
5. Social security induces laziness *	<b>3.10</b>	3.35	3.37	3.46
6. Poverty is due to personal factors **	<b>3.02</b>	3.23	3.35	3.33
7. Empower oneself to meet the challenge of economic restructuring **	4.06	3.89	3.89	<b>3.80</b>
8. I have my own plan for the future ***	3.70	3.34	3.28	<b>3.03</b>
9. My living standard will worsen ***	2.96	3.57	3.61	<b>3.64</b>
10. I do not get the rewards I deserve *	2.82	2.93	2.98	<b>3.13</b>
11. One should be prepared to change job in HK	3.70	3.62	3.77	3.71
12. Our generation has more opportunities than our parents	3.68	3.7	3.73	3.63

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05

### 3.2.3 Identity and Sense of Belonging

The variation in self-perceived identity among cohorts, shown in Table 3.12, might be considered counter-intuitive. A plurality of the post-80s identified themselves as Hong Kongers, yet a slightly higher proportion of the pre-60s also opted for this identity. Consequently, these two cohorts were less likely than the post-60s and post-70s cohorts to identify themselves as Chinese.

Table 3.12 Respondents' self-identity

	Post-80s	Post-70s	Post-60s	Pre-60s
	%	%	%	%
Hong Konger	42.3	34.5	37.1	43.6
Chinese	37.7	46.6	51.0	41.3
Both	20.0	18.1	11.4	15.1
Neither one	0.0	0.9	0.5	0.0
Total	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.0

p > 0.05

A related finding concerns the strength of the sense of belonging to Hong Kong. The relevant question asked respondents to rate their sense of belonging on a 5-point scale with 1 being very little sense of belonging and 5 a very strong sense of belonging. The pre-60s had the highest mean score (3.70) while the post-80s cohort had the lowest mean score (3.39).

Table 3.13 Mean score on sense of belonging to Hong Kong

	Post-80s	Post-70s	Post-60s	Pre-60s
Mean score	3.39	3.46	3.56	3.7

(1=very little, 5=very much)

### 3.2.4 Life Satisfaction

In addition to social perceptions and value orientations, the community survey also assessed satisfaction of respondents in various life domains, which is the core subject in social indicators research. Respondents were asked to evaluate their satisfaction with 5 conditions on the community level, 6 personal life domains and 1 overall life satisfaction.

Table 3.14 presents findings with regard to satisfaction with community living conditions, with higher mean scores indicating a higher level of

satisfaction. Variations among cohorts were found to be statistically significant for only one item, the evaluation of employment opportunities in community. The pre-60s and post-60s cohorts had the lowest mean scores while the post-80s cohort had the second highest mean score, following the post-70s cohort. It is also worth noting that mean scores for satisfaction with employment in community were the lowest across the five community living conditions.

Table 3.14 Satisfaction with community living conditions

	Post-80s	Post-70s	Post-60s	Pre-60s
Employment opportunities in community ***	2.74	2.87	2.41	2.39
Community law & order	3.41	3.44	3.5	3.56
Community transportation	3.24	3.3	3.14	3.27
Community living environment	3.55	3.61	3.62	3.6
Education in community	3.34	3.45	3.39	3.22

\*\*\* p < 0.001

Mean scores on 5-point scale, 1=very dissatisfied, 5=very satisfied

Higher score, more satisfied

Table 3.15 compares satisfaction with life domains and overall life satisfaction across cohorts. Differences among cohorts in overall life satisfaction, and five out of six life domains were found to be statistically significant. All cohorts were moderately satisfied with family life, health, education attainment, leisure and entertainment. The younger generations were moderately satisfied with their financial situation, but the older ones were dissatisfied. By cohorts, the post-80s were the relatively most satisfied generation (except for the domain of work), while the post-60s (but not the oldest generation) were least satisfied. The pattern is also repeated for overall life satisfaction, with the post-80s scoring highest and post-60s scoring the lowest.



Table 3.15 Satisfaction with life domains and overall life satisfaction

	Post-80s	Post-70s	Post-60s	Pre-60s
Family life *	<b>3.79</b>	3.6	<b>3.58</b>	3.61
Health condition *	<b>3.61</b>	3.61	3.49	<b>3.39</b>
Education attainment ***	<b>3.42</b>	3.05	<b>2.9</b>	3.08
Leisure and entertainment ***	<b>3.37</b>	3.2	<b>3.00</b>	3.18
Financial situation **	<b>3.15</b>	3.11	<b>2.84</b>	2.94
Work	3.44	3.49	3.24	3.31
Overall life satisfaction **	<b>3.65</b>	3.46	<b>3.33</b>	3.36

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05

Mean scores on 5-point scale, 1=very dissatisfied, 5=very satisfied

Higher score, more satisfied

### 3.3 Discussion

Are the post-80s more radical and discontented as anecdotal evidence suggests? Based on statistical analysis of existing datasets, we find the evidence to support this anecdotal generalization to be mixed.

Although the samples we used in data analysis may not be representative enough to generalize to the youth population of Hong Kong, we believe our findings nevertheless provide solid enough evidence relevant to serious discussion about the orientations and behavior of the post-80s cohort as well as having policy implications. We summarize the social attitudes of youth, especially the post-80s cohort as follows:

- less supportive of high speed rail budget
- more negative views of functional constituencies
- more inclined to support the demand for a timetable or roadmap for universal suffrage

- more supportive of resignation of Civic Party and LSD legislators and the By-election, but NOT more inclined to recast their vote for candidates from these two parties
- identify more with LSD than the other cohorts, but are still more supportive of DP than LSD
- appear to be susceptible to issue-based mobilization based on “post-80” identities
- not more radical than the post-70s in disapproval of the 2012 constitutional reform bill
- not more skeptical than other cohorts with regard to progress in democratization under the 2012 constitutional reform
- more positive with regard to living standards
- more positive in believing hardworking will bring success
- more positive in planning for their own future
- more positive in accommodating economic restructuring
- more identified with Hong Kong
- lowest degree of sense of belonging to Hong Kong
- more satisfied than other cohorts with life in almost all domains

These results suggest that while there are some signs that the younger generation is more critical of the government and political establishment, this negative orientation is not fixed but is significantly influenced by political events and mobilization. The surge of negative perceptions among the younger cohort towards the political reform package after the anti-high speed rail movement is a clear illustration of this point. Furthermore, the negative sentiments among the younger cohorts, to the extent they exist, are not related to a more negative evaluation of their personal situations. Even though young people tend to be more critical of the government, they are in general more positive when it comes to evaluating their own situations.

The implications of these findings are twofold. First, how political or social movement mobilizations affect young peoples' political orientations and behavioral propensities is worth further exploration. Second, we should further examine the correlation, if any, between young people's personal and socioeconomic conditions and their social and political orientations. We need to discover, for example, whether there are any material conditions characteristic of this group of young people that are related to holding negative orientations to the society and government.

## IV. Other Relevant Local Studies

### 4.1 *Protest and Post-80s Youth*

Prof. Michael DeGolyer of Baptist University and the Director of Hong Kong Transition Project has published a report entitled *Protest and post-80s Youth* in February 2010 (available for download at [http://www.hktp.org/list/protest\\_and\\_post\\_80s\\_youths.pdf](http://www.hktp.org/list/protest_and_post_80s_youths.pdf)). The report draws on evidence from the author's two telephone surveys conducted in October 2009 and January 2010. The first survey interviewed 841 voters and non-voters, and the second 1,500 registered voters. Readers should note that the two surveys did not adopt equivalent sampling frames. Although direct comparison with our analysis in previous paragraphs is not possible, we would like to highlight some of Prof. DeGolyer's findings from his report for further evidence and insight relevant to the focus of our research. The following statistics are extracted from the report, and mainly refer to the second survey done in January 2010 unless otherwise stated.

Table 4.1 Post-80s are NOT more dissatisfied with Government

**Chart/Table 18 Satisfaction with performance of the Hong Kong Government by Age Groups, among those Registered to Vote (Oct 2009)**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-85	total
Very dissatisfied	0	8	13	17	21	15	14	15
Dissatisfied	28	43	54	44	42	30	38	41
Satisfied	72	48	32	39	34	54	49	42
Very satisfied	0	1	0	0	4	1	9	2
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 47.01 with 18 df p = 0.0002

**Chart/Table 20 Satisfaction with performance of Hong Kong Government by Age Groups (Jan 2010)**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-85	total
Very dissatisfied	23	16	13	14	14	18	10	14
Dissatisfied	29	42	47	42	39	33	29	40
Satisfied	48	40	39	44	45	46	52	44
Very satisfied	0	2	1	--	2	3	10	2
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 51.43 with 18 df p ≤ 0.0001

Table 4.2 Post-80s perceive Government policies more negatively

**Chart/Table 50 Do you think the government currently makes policies in general fairly, helping or hurting all parties equally, or unfairly, favoring the interests of some over others? (Oct 2009)**

	18-29	30-59	60-85	total
Very fairly	1	1	2	1
Somewhat fairly	24	28	32	28
Unfairly	61	48	42	49
Very unfairly	11	16	13	15
Don't Know	3	6	10	6
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 19.64 with 8 df p = 0.0118

Table 4.3 Post-80s perceive more positively to change Government policies by Hong Kong People

**Chart/Table 53 If many Hong Kong people disagree with certain policies of the Hong Kong Government, do you think they would change or modify those policies?**

	18-29	30-59	60-85	total
Yes	24	15	8	15
Maybe	24	27	25	26
Hard to say	26	24	34	26
Maybe not	6	5	5	5
No	20	26	24	25
Don't Know	1	3	5	3
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 24.54 with 10 df p = 0.0063

Table 4.4 Post-80s are more receptive to gradual constitutional reform

**Chart/Table 57 How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statements for and against reform: Gradual reform is better than no progress at all**

	18-29	30-59	60-85	total
Strongly agree	22	22	30	23
Agree	58	55	45	53
Neutral/DK	13	12	11	12
Disagree	4	9	11	8
Strongly Disagree	3	4	3	3
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 20.37 with 8 df p = 0.0090

Table 4.5 Post-80s are more skeptical of Government consultation

**Chart/Table 60** How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statements for and against reform: **Government always holds fake consultations, so pan-democrats must reject the government plan**

	18-29	30-59	60-85	total
Strongly agree	12	11	12	12
Agree	38	33	28	33
Neutral/DK	23	19	20	20
Disagree	25	31	31	30
Strongly Disagree	2	5	9	5
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 19.83 with 8 df p = 0.0110

Table 4.6 Post-80s are more inclined to support full direct elections in 2012

**Chart/Table 88** In your view, what should your Legco member's top priority be: **Passing reforms . . .**

	18-29	30-59	60-85	total
of any kind possible	16	15	12	15
widening right to vote in FCs	7	9	9	9
reducing # of FCs	18	18	13	17
for full direct elections in 2012	36	33	27	32
approved by Beijing	11	8	19	11
NO reforms	4	4	3	4
Don't Know	9	13	17	13
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 42.09 with 12 df p ≤ 0.0001

Table 4.7 Post-80s are more supportive of having Legislators resign to force a referendum

**Chart/Table 61** How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statements for and against reform: **Pan-democrats should have one member resign from each Legco district to force a referendum vote**

	18-29	30-59	60-85	total
Strongly agree	9	6	7	6
Agree	25	19	18	20
Neutral/DK	22	17	17	18
Disagree	37	44	38	41
Strongly Disagree	8	15	20	15
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 26.93 with 8 df p = 0.0007

Table 4.8 Post-80s are slightly more supportive of radical democrats

**Chart/Table 80 Of the 5 biggest political parties in Legco (DAB, DP, LSD, LP and Civic Party), which party, if any, do you feel represents or protects your interests best? (Jan 2010)**

	18-29	30-59	60-85	total
DAB	9	15	24	16
Democratic Party	13	13	9	12
League of Social Democrats	10	4	3	4
Liberal Party	6	3	4	4
Civic Party	10	14	7	12
All of them	3	4	3	4
None of them	42	38	36	38
Don't Know	7	10	15	11
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 67.19 with 14 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

#### 4.2 Japanese Youth - in Comparison with the Youth of the World

The Cabinet Office of the Government of Japan has been regularly conducting surveys on youth to compare with the World Youth Survey project. The latest survey was conducted from February to June 2003. A report entitled *The Japanese Youth - in Comparison with the Youth of the World: A Summary Report of the Seventh World Youth Survey, 2003* was published in January 2004 and is available for download at :

<http://www8.cao.go.jp/youth/english/worldyouth7-e/html/mokuji-e.html>

The 7th World Youth Survey involved 5 countries, and in each country 1,000 youth aged 18 to 24 were interviewed. The following two Figures have been extracted from the above cited website.

Figure 4.9 Youth Interest in Politics (Country Comparison)





Figure 4.10 Youth Satisfaction with Society (Country Comparison)





### 4.3 Local Surveys to Compare with the World Youth Survey

The Youth Research Centre of the Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups conducted two telephone surveys for comparative analysis with the 7th World Youth Survey, one on 2 to 7 December 2004, and the other on 17 to 28 January 2005. The first survey interviewed 452 youth aged from 18 to 24, and the second 462 youth. The formal report has not yet published but the Youth Research Centre has released some statistics reported in the local newspaper, *Ming Pao*, on 18 March 2010 as follows:

Table 4.11 Something To Be Proud of About Your Country

表一：你覺得（自己國家/居住地）有什麼令你自豪？

國家/地區	次序	1	2	3	4	5
香港		自由/和平 58.8%	法律/治安 58.0%	國際聲望 56.0%	生活水平 53.9%	社會穩定 46.0%
中國		歷史遺產 74.4%	發展機會 56.2%	自然環境/ 資源 55.3%	體育運動 54.2%	文化藝術 52.2%
日本		歷史遺產 50.0%	文化藝術 31.7%	法律/治安 28.9%	生活水平 24.6%	科技 24.5%
韓國		歷史遺產 64.8%	國民身分 30.9%	文化藝術 25.0%	體育 24.8%	自然環境/ 資源 20.0%
美國		歷史遺產 70.0%	科學同科技 66.3%	體育運動 62.3%	生活水平 62.2%	自然環境/ 資源 56.1%
瑞典		生活水平 72.1%	自然環境/ 資源 67.1%	教育水平 62.0%	體育運動 61.1%	自由/和平 53.7%
德國		生活水平 54.3%	科技 48.9%	文化藝術 43.7%	福利 40.3%	體育 38.1%

註：答案可選多項

Table 4.12 How many times have you changed your job?

表二：你讀完書之後轉過幾多次工？

轉工次數 \ 國家/地區	德國	瑞典	美國	韓國	日本	香港
從來無轉過工	56.4%	31.8%	27.3%	40.3%	54.2%	31.4%
1次	23.1%	18.6%	23.1%	20.0%	20.8%	17.6%
2次	8.6%	14.7%	21.7%	18.2%	12.4%	23.5%
3次	4.1%	14.0%	9.6%	9.8%	5.7%	10.9%
4次或以上	4.6%	19.0%	12.4%	10.4%	4.1%	14.3%
唔知/難講	3.2%	1.9%	6.0%	1.3%	2.7%	2.2%

註：數據經加權處理，加上進位的原因，各項百分比合計可能不等於100%

Table 4.13 Are you satisfied with your work life?

表三：你是否滿意你的工作？

滿意程度 \ 國家/地區	德國	瑞典	美國	韓國	日本	香港
滿意	49.6%	47.7%	50.9%	31.9%	26.3%	52.9%
幾滿意	36.5%	38.4%	31.9%	40.3%	45.0%	32.0%
唔係幾滿意	7.6%	9.0%	10.4%	18.9%	18.7%	11.2%
唔滿意	3.0%	3.4%	6.3%	5.4%	6.5%	2.6%
唔知/難講	3.3%	1.4%	0.5%	3.5%	3.5%	1.4%

註：數據經加權處理，加上進位的原因，各項百分比合計可能不等於100%

資料來源：

青協，香港青年趨勢分析2004-2006，「國際青年價值觀比較」調查部分

The above studies on world youth offer comparative analysis across countries. However, the World Youth Survey only interviewed youth in the 18-24 age range. Without cross-cohort comparisons, we did not know how unique those youth are relative to the whole population. On the other hand, the secondary analysis on our earlier surveys (discussed in previous chapter) finds differences among generations. The objectives and target populations of those surveys do not deal specifically with youth attitudes. As a result, it was considered necessary to conduct a telephone survey to focus specifically on

exploring the social attitudes of youth in Hong Kong today and to make comparison across generations. In the following chapters, we present a statistical analysis of findings from our telephone survey and discuss the relevant implications of these findings.

## **V. Telephone Survey on Social Attitudes of the Youth Population in Hong Kong Conducted in May-June 2010**

### 5.1 Telephone Survey Administration

The telephone survey was conducted from 24 May to 25 June 2010 by the Telephone Laboratory of the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. The Telephone Laboratory has ample experience since 1980s in administering questionnaire surveys, through both face-to-face interview format and by telephone, for social and policy research. The target respondents of the present study were Hong Kong youth born during the years 1980 to 1995. In addition, those born in the 1970s were also surveyed as a reference group to compare and contrast with the younger sample. Thus, the target population included those aged between 15 and 40. A total of 2,003 respondents who completed the survey were drawn from that target population. The procedures to select this sample followed a strict probability sampling method and also, as is common practice for other telephone surveys, only landline household telephone numbers were generated by computer and then calls were made by interviewers. If a household contacted had more than one eligible respondent, a random process was used to select only one respondent from that household. If the chosen individual was not at home or not free to answer, follow-up calls were made. With random selection, we try to reduce systematic sampling error as much as possible. The response rate for the telephone survey was 72.1%, which was calculated from all telephone calls with known eligible respondent(s) present in the households. Telephone numbers without an eligible respondent (i.e. no household member aged between 15 and 40) were not included in calculating the response rate.

Telephone surveys enable the reaching of a large number of respondents in a

relatively much shorter period of time than face-to-face interviews. For our survey, we managed to complete telephone interviews with about 2,000 respondents in only a month's time, which would have not been achievable by using the face-to-face interview method. A major limitation of telephone surveys, however, is the shorter attention span of respondents. As a result, the number of questions we could include in our survey was much fewer than the number that could be used in a typical face-to-face survey. According to the experience of the Telephone Laboratory, the maximum number of questions that should be asked on the telephone is 40 since respondents are likely to hang up once this threshold is reached so that the interview would be incomplete. The questions we asked in the study cover basic demographics, social values, political orientations, affiliation and participations, acquisition of political information, life satisfaction, personal development, and postmaterialist values orientation. Although we wanted to ask many questions, we had to limit ourselves to relatively few for each aspect of youth attitudes. After consultation with Prof. M. K. Lee of the CPU, a pilot study was conducted in mid-May 2010 using a draft questionnaire. Results of the pilot survey provided useful feedback on the workability of individual questions as well as the length of time required to complete the questionnaire. Following further valuable inputs from Prof. M. K. Lee, the questionnaire was finalized and the telephone survey went into full swing from 24 May 2010. The final version of the questionnaire is found in Appendix 1. Statistical findings from the survey are reported in the rest of this chapter.

## 5.2 Demographic Characteristics

Of the total of 2,003 respondents who completed the survey, 1,108 (55.3%) are female and 895 (44.7%) male. By generational distribution, 552 (27.6%) are post-90s, 667 (33.3%) post-80s, and 784 (39.1%) post-70s. By educational

attainment, 12.6% are junior secondary or below, 46.4% senior secondary, and 41.0% tertiary education or above. A majority of the respondents (73.2%) were born in Hong Kong. Of those not born in Hong Kong, 12.7% have lived here less than 7 years, 38.2% between 7 and 15 years, and the remaining 49.1% 15 years or more. Only 12.9% of respondents have experience of living, education, or working overseas. The median household monthly income category is \$10,000-\$29,999. Classified by economic activity status, 55.8% are economically active, 34.5% students, and 9.6% economically inactive. Table 5.1 presents the basic demographic characteristics for the sample as a whole and by generation.

The demographic characteristics of the three generations differ to some extent. However, many of the differences can be regarded as the product of the age effect, e.g. more post-90s than post-70s are students. On the other hand, some differences may have further sociological implications, e.g. the finding that more post-90s than post-70s were born in Hong Kong, which may have influence on local / national identity formation. Readers are reminded that sheer differences in demographic characteristics per se cannot be used to account for differences in social attitudes among generations.

Table 5.1 Demographic Characteristics

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
Female	53.4%	52.8%	58.8%	55.3%
Male	46.6%	47.2%	41.2%	44.7%
Education				
Junior secondary or below	15.9%	4.1%	17.4%	12.6%
Senior secondary	74.3%	32.0%	39.1%	46.4%
Tertiary education or above	9.8%	63.9%	43.5%	41.0%
Born in Hong Kong	78.4%	74.6%	68.2%	73.2%
Not born in Hong Kong	21.6%	25.4%	31.8%	26.9%
Lived in HK < 7 years	16.1%	8.9%	13.7%	12.7%
Lived in HK 7-15 years	64.4%	43.2%	22.5%	38.2%
Lived in HK 15 years or more	19.5%	48.1%	63.8%	49.1%
Overseas living experience	4.3%	13.7%	18.4%	12.9%
No overseas experience	95.7%	86.3%	81.6%	87.1%
Median monthly household income group	\$10,000 - 29,999	\$10,000 - 29,999	\$30,000 - 59,999	\$10,000 - 29,999
Economic Activity Status				
Economically active	6.9%	67.9%	80.1%	55.8%
Students	92.8%	26.8%	0%	34.5%
Economically inactive	0.4%	5.2%	19.9%	9.6%

### 5.3 Democratic Development and Environmental Conservation are Preferred

Given the limitation on the number of questions that could be asked, the survey followed advice from Prof. M .K. Lee of CPU to measure respondents' value orientations by asking them to chose between bi-polar positions on three social conditions. The forced-choice options put to respondents concerned: (a) democratic development over governance; (b) environmental conservation over economic growth; and (c) a tax increase to support conservation. Similar bi-polar orientations have been extensively examined in the theory of and research on postmaterialism since 1970s. We will discuss postmaterialism in more detail in the next chapter. Tables 5.2-5.4 show that a majority of respondents adopt postmaterialist positions on democracy and environmental conservation. Although generational differences were found to be statistically significant, the magnitude of difference in percentage points is within single-digit. The support by a substantial majority for postmaterialist orientations is common across generations. While we should not jump to the conclusion that most Hong Kongers are postmaterialists, we could say on the basis of the evidence that for many Hong Kong people democracy and conservation are desirable value positions.

Table 5.2 Democratic Development is preferable to Government Efficiency

(你同唔同意民主發展比政府管治效率更加重要呢?)

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
	%	%	%	%
Agree / Strongly Agree	73.4	68.5	60.8	66.8
Disagree / Strongly disagree	23.2	23.7	27.6	25.1
Don't know	3.4	7.8	11.6	8.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

p < 0.001 (i.e. difference among generations is found statistically significant at probability less than 0.001)



Table 5.3 Environmental Conservation is preferable to Economic Growth

(你同唔同意環境保育比經濟發展更加重要呢?)

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
	%	%	%	%
Agree / Strongly Agree	80.3	77.5	70.5	75.5
Disagree / Strongly disagree	17.9	18.4	21.9	19.7
Don't know	1.8	4.0	7.5	4.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

p < 0.001

Table 5.4 Pay More Tax for Environmental Conservation

(你贊唔贊成爲咗保育環境而要你俾多啲稅呢?)

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
	%	%	%	%
Agree / Strongly Agree	71.4	73.2	67.1	70.3
Disagree / Strongly disagree	26.3	23.2	27.0	25.6
Don't know	2.4	3.6	5.9	4.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

p < 0.01

#### 5.4 Civic Engagement and Seeking Political Information

Anti-establishment sentiment is more readily manifested in attitudes than in actions of our respondents. Table 5.5 indicates that a majority of all respondents (71.3%) have not joined any demonstration or rally since 1997, and a mere 1.4% report having joined frequently. The participation pattern is very similar across the three generations, although slightly higher percentages from the post-70s group than others report having engaged in these civic acts occasionally or frequently.

The low level of participation in demonstrations or rallies could reflect

respondents' lack of knowledge about or interest in these political activities. To examine whether lack of knowledge was an important factor, we asked respondents if they had been aware of demonstration or rallies to be organized. Table 5.6 shows that a substantial majority of respondents (85.7%) are aware of demonstrations or rallies to be organized. The generational difference is not statistically significant, indicating that information seeking relating to civic actions is common among all respondents irrespective of age.

Table 5.5 How often participating in Demonstrations or Rallies since 1997?

(自 1997 年回歸以來，你有冇參加過示威集會、遊行呢?)

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
	%	%	%	%
Never	79.3	68.7	67.9	71.3
Seldom	14.3	17.1	13.9	15.1
Occasionally	5.8	12.6	15.7	11.9
Frequently	0.4	1.5	2.0	1.4
Don't know	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

$p < 0.001$

Table 5.6 Awareness of Demonstrations or Rallies to be Organized

(無論以往你有冇參加過示威集會遊行，你事前有冇留意有關消息呢?)

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
	%	%	%	%
Aware	84.6	84.9	87.1	85.7
Unaware	15.4	15.1	12.9	14.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

$p > 0.05$  (i.e. difference among generations is found to be statistically insignificant)

How do respondents learn about the holding of demonstrations and rallies? As shown in Table 5.7, for all respondents, conventional mass media are still the

major channels to receive information on civic actions to be organized, with 72.6% mentioning television programs (but not sure which kinds of programs, perhaps news reports could be most significant) and newspapers (59.0%). Television is also the most usual channel for the 3 generations while newspapers ranks second for the post-70s and the post-80s, but only third for the post-90s (and the gap is sizeable). Receiving information on civic actions through Internet or mobile phone SMS is the second most common channel for the post-90s, but ranks third for the post-80s and post-70s. The older generation thus has a notably different pattern for using electronic communications than younger ones.

Table 5.7 Channels for Learning About Demonstrations or Rallies to be Organized (multiple responses allowed)

(你主要係靠乜嘢方法得知示威集會遊行嘅消息呢?)

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
	%	%	%	%
TV	<b>69.8</b>	<b>69.8</b>	<b>76.9</b>	72.6
Newspapers	45.8	<b>60.4</b>	<b>66.9</b>	59.0
Electronic communications (e.g. Internet or SMS)	<b>49.0</b>	45.8	30.5	40.6
Informed verbally by others	17.3	15.9	16.7	16.6
Radio	0.2	0.9	1.3	0.9
Banners or handbills	0.2	0.9	0.4	0.5
On street propaganda by political parties	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.2
Magazines	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
School / Teachers	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.1

Table 5.8 provides further details, for those who report having used electronic communications to receive information about demonstrations and rallies, about their use of such communications. The most common means of communication used is the Internet in general. A majority of all respondents (57.3%) report receiving information via a specific website or online forum (no follow up question was asked about which individual site or on-line forum was used), Facebook ranks second (43.1%) and Email third (15.4%). Mobile phone SMS is not a significant means for communicating political information among our respondents. There are generational differences in the pattern of internet usage. The post-90s use Facebook the most while the post-80s and the post-70s prefer to use specific websites or online forum. Email is the third most popular for the post-80s and the post-70s, but not for the post-90s. Instead, the post-90s use blogs and instant messaging more than email. Email seems to be a legacy service to the post-90s as the percentage of users is just about one-third of that of the post-70s, or half of that of the post-80s. For the post-90s, blogs and instant messaging are more frequently used channels to obtain political information. The causes and consequences of these different usage patterns are issues that should be tackled in future research.

Table 5.8 How Users of Electronic Communications Learn about Demonstration or Rallies to be Organized (multiple responses allowed)

(你又主要係靠以下邊個途徑知道示威集會遊行嘅消息呢?) [只問有靠上網或手機短訊得知的受訪者]

	Post-90s %	Post-80s %	Post-70s %	All %
Specific website or online forum	54.1	<b>61.4</b>	<b>55.8</b>	57.3
Facebook	<b>56.8</b>	42.5	28.8	43.1
Email	8.3	14.3	24.5	15.4
Blogs	11.8	9.7	5.3	9.1
Instant Messaging	10.9	9.3	9.6	9.9
Mobile phone SMS	8.7	7.3	12.5	9.3
Others	0.9	1.2	0.0	0.7
Don't know / forget	0.4	4.2	5.8	3.4

## 5.5 Voting Behavior in the Legislative Council By-election

Held on 16 May 2010

Relatively few respondents report having engaged in social actions since 1997. But to what extent did they vote in the Legislative Council (LegCo) By-election held on 16 May 2010? First of all, as shown in Table 5.9, more than a half of respondents (57.8%) report that they were registered to vote in the By-election.

Table 5.9 Distribution of Respondents by Whether Registered to Vote in By-election

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
	%	%	%	%
Registered to vote	23.0	66.0	75.4	57.8
Not registered to vote	77.0	34.0	24.6	42.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

p < 0.001

Among the registered voters in the sample, 31.6% voted in the LegCo By-election held on 16 May 2010 as shown in Table 5.10. Interestingly, this percentage is much higher than the official voter turnout rate of 17.1%. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is the common tendency in survey interviews for respondents to give socially desirable answers. With regard to the generational comparison, the result here does not exactly match the intuitive interpretation found in the mass media that the By-election was much more appealing to the younger generation. Eligible voters of the post-90s cohort were the least likely to vote (20.5%) in the By-election, with the percentage voting only about half that of the post-80s voters (36.1%).

Table 5.10 Voted in LegCo By-election held on 16-5-2010? (Eligible voters only)

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
	%	%	%	%
Voted	20.5	36.1	30.7	31.6
Not voted	79.5	63.9	69.3	68.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

p < 0.01

Despite the difference in voter turnout rates among generations, their choices are almost identical. A substantial majority from all generations reported voting for candidates from the Civic Party or League of Social

Democrats (LSD) as shown in Table 5.11. And the proportion casting empty vote is almost the same across all generations. For those who did vote in the By-election, why did they do so? Table 5.12 shows that percentages choosing between two reasons for casting a vote in By-election are close: (1) 46% for civic responsibility, and (2) 37.4% for supporting a simulated referendum. The percentages of the post-80s and the post-70s choosing between the two reasons were similar, with more choosing civic responsibility than a simulated referendum. The post-90s cohort, however, displays a reverse pattern. More than half of them (53.8%) cast a vote because of their support for the idea of a simulated referendum promoted by the Civic Party and LSD. As discussed before, the By-election was not particularly appealing to the post-90s eligible voters. However, once they were mobilized, a majority of them were motivated by the idea of the simulated referendum.

Table 5.11 Who They Cast Their Vote for in the LegCo By-election held on 16-5-2010 (only those having voted in By-election)

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
	%	%	%	%
Civic Party / LSD	73.1	71.5	77.7	74.7
Tertiary 2012	15.4	9.5	6.1	8.3
Others	3.8	11.4	8.9	9.6
Empty vote	7.7	7.6	7.3	7.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

p > 0.05 (i.e. difference among generations is not statistically significant)

Table 5.12 Reason for Casting a Vote in the LegCo By-election held on 16-5-2010  
(only those having voted in By-election)

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
	%	%	%	%
For civic responsibility	34.6	43.4	50.0	46.0
Support simulated referendum	<b>53.8</b>	35.8	36.4	37.4
For both reasons	11.5	18.2	11.9	14.7
Other reason	0.0	2.5	1.7	1.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

$p > 0.05$  (i.e. difference among generations is not statistically significant)

## 5.6 Life Satisfaction

The present survey has assessed satisfaction of respondents with selected social conditions, which is the core subject in social indicators research. Given the limitation to the length of a telephone survey, respondents were asked to evaluate only three social conditions relevant to this study, plus the usual overall measures of quality of life. Satisfaction was measured using a 5-point rating scale: 1 is very dissatisfied, 3 the mid-point, and 5 very satisfied.

Table 5.13 shows respondents' satisfaction with three life domains: economic development, environmental conservation, and political development. The results indicate that our respondents as a whole are slightly dissatisfied in the three life domains, as the mean scores are just under 3. All generations have indicated dissatisfaction with the three life domains (except for the post-90s). Although the differences among generations are statistically significant, the magnitude of these differences is relatively small. The only exception is the post-90s cohort with a mean satisfaction score of 3.17 for economic development. It may be due to the fact that over 90% of the post-90s are students so that economic pressure is not yet their major concern.



Across all cohorts, respondents are relatively dissatisfied with the conditions of environmental conservation and political development in Hong Kong.

Table 5.13 Satisfaction with Three Types of Social Conditions

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
Economic development in HK ***	3.17	2.96	2.89	2.99
Environmental conservation in HK **	2.65	2.63	2.78	2.70
Political development in HK ***	2.82	2.57	2.65	2.67

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01

Mean scores on 5-point scale, 1=very dissatisfied, 5=very satisfied

Higher score, more satisfied

Table 5.14 reports findings with respect to assessment of overall quality of life, measured using the same 5-point scale as described above. The mean scores for the overall sample reflect the respondents' generally positive evaluation towards personal conditions. The post-90s are relatively more satisfied with their overall life than the other two generations. Likewise, they evaluate more positively their health and overall happiness than the other two generations. Although these differences among generations are statistically significant, they are not large. All generations are on average slightly satisfied with their personal life, in contrast to their relatively negative evaluation of broader social conditions shown in Table 5.13.

Table 5.14 Self-Assessment of Quality of Life

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
Overall life satisfaction ***	3.36	3.21	3.25	3.27
Satisfaction with health condition ***	3.69	3.48	3.47	3.54
Overall happiness ***	3.66	3.50	3.48	3.53

\*\*\* p < 0.001

Mean scores on 5-point scale:

1=very dissatisfied, 5=very satisfied => higher score, more satisfied; or

1=very unhappy, 5=very happy => higher score, happier

## 5.7 Identity and Political Trust

Respondents indicated they are relatively dissatisfied with broad social conditions. Then, would this in turn weaken their national and Hong Kong identity, and their political trust in the HKSAR government and Central governments? Table 5.15 shows that a substantial majority of the youth population identify themselves as Hong Kongers, but in fact the percentage who so identify themselves is just over 80% across all generations. National identification, which is measured by self-identification as Chinese, is high (71.1%) for the sample overall but lower than the percentage identifying themselves as Hong Kongers. There is a statistically significant difference among generations. Less than 70% of the post-90s and the post-80s identify themselves as Chinese, whereas close to 80% of the post-70s do so.

Comparatively speaking, a higher percentage of respondents have trust in the Hong Kong SAR Government (57.7%) than in the Central Government (44.6%), but the percentages are notably lower than those for the corresponding Hong Kong / China identification. Trust in the Hong Kong SAR and Central Governments also vary significantly among generations. The post-80s are the most critical towards the establishment. They have the lowest percentages trusting in the Hong Kong SAR Government (54.8%) and in the Central Government (39.4%). The post-90s, on the other hand, have the highest percentage (65.2%) trusting in the Hong Kong SAR Government. The percentages trusting the Hong Kong and Central Governments are similar among the post-70s, both over 50%.

Table 5.15 Identity and Political Trust

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s “Baseline”	All
	%	%	%	%
Indigenous identity: agree/strongly identified as Hong Konger (認同/非常認同自己是香港人)	81.9	82.6	81.0	81.8
National identity: agree/strongly identified as Chinese * (認同/非常認同自己是中國人)	62.9	68.4	79.2	71.1
Trust/strongly trust HK SAR Government * (信任/非常信任香港政府)	65.2	54.8	55.1	57.7
Trust/strongly trust Central Government * (信任/非常信任中央政府)	42.2	39.4	50.5	44.6

\* p &lt; 0.001

## 5.8 Attitudes Toward Education and Employment in the Mainland

Although respondents do not particularly favor national identity over local identity or trust the Central Government, they are generally welcome opportunities to study or work in the Mainland. Table 5.16 shows that almost 60% of respondents find it acceptable to pursue further study in the Mainland. The percentage is similar across generations. Table 5.17 shows the a similar or even slightly greater positive evaluation towards working in the Mainland. About 60% of respondents would be willing to accept work in the Mainland, and even slightly higher percentages are found among the post-90s (61.3%) and post-80s (62.9%). However, the percentage of post-70s willing to accept a job in China drops slightly to 57.6%. To summarize, our respondents, especially the younger generations, are not, at least at an ideological level, that positive towards establishing connections with the Mainland. But when it comes to

personal life and development, the younger generations find it much more acceptable to have connections with the Mainland, e.g. through further studies and employment opportunities.

Table 5.16 Attitudes towards Pursuing Further Studies in the Mainland

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
	%	%	%	%
Accept / Strongly accept	56.1	59.4	58.8	58.2
Reject / Strongly reject	42.1	36.0	33.2	36.7
Indifferent	1.8	4.6	7.9	5.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

$p < 0.001$

Table 5.17 Attitudes towards Taking Up Employment in the Mainland

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
	%	%	%	%
Accept / Strongly accept	61.3	62.9	57.6	60.4
Reject / Strongly reject	34.7	31.3	37.0	34.4
Indifferent	4.0	5.8	5.4	5.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

$p > 0.05$

## 5.9 Block Upward Mobility as a Factor in Negative Sentiments among Youth?

Some recent observers of social unrest among youth suggest blocked upward mobility could be one of the reasons for their negative sentiments. To assess this possibility, we asked respondents three questions relating to their opportunities for personal development in Hong Kong. Table 5.18 shows the findings in response to the question about the amount of opportunity they perceive to be available to their age cohort for personal development. About 50% of all respondents perceive moderate opportunities available to their age cohort. However, the post-80s and post-90s are more discontented than the post-70s with the opportunities available to their own age cohort. Over 30% of younger generations perceive limited or no opportunity available for their personal development compared with a smaller percentage of post-70s (27.6%) who perceive none/limited opportunity.

Table 5.18 Perception of Opportunities Available to Same Age Cohort for Personal

### Development in Hong Kong

(你認為同你年齡相近嘅香港人，喺香港各方面發展嘅機會多唔多呢?)

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
	%	%	%	%
None / Limited	35.5	33.6	27.6	31.8
Moderate	49.5	47.9	51.7	49.8
Many	15.0	18.5	20.7	18.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

p < 0.001

Table 5.19 Comparing with the present, will opportunities for personal development in Hong Kong become better or worse in future?

(你認為同你年齡相近嘅香港人，未來嘅香港各方面發展嘅機會，同依家相比，係會好啲、差唔多，定係差啲?)

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
	%	%	%	%
Worse than now	41.1	40.5	50.2	44.4
About the same	39.8	44.6	40.1	41.5
Better than now	19.2	14.9	9.7	14.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

p < 0.001

A second question asked respondents about their perception of opportunities for personal development in future. As shown in Table 5.19, across all generations, about 40% of respondents expect their future would be the same as now. With respect to generational differences however, the findings are counter-intuitive to anecdotal observations that younger generations are supposedly more pessimistic about their future. In fact, the younger generations are more optimistic about their future development than older ones. About 40% of the post-90s and post-80s expect that their future would be worse than now, while about 50% of the post-70s feel this way. On the other hand, only 9.7% of the post-70s expect a better opportunity for personal development in future, whereas about double the percentage (19.2%) of the post-90s and 14.9% of the post-80s expect better opportunities.

Table 5.20 Generally speaking, are you satisfied with the opportunities for your own development in Hong Kong?

(整體嚟講，你滿唔滿自己喺香港所得嘅發展機會呢?)

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
	%	%	%	%
Dissatisfied / Very dissatisfied	24.8	28.2	22.1	24.9
Average	38.5	41.2	39.1	39.6
Satisfied / Very satisfied	36.7	30.6	38.8	35.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

$p < 0.001$

A third question asked respondents how satisfied they are with opportunities for their own development. Their overall assessment is shown in Table 5.20. About a quarter of all respondents are dissatisfied with the opportunities available for their own development. Satisfied respondents (35.5%) are more than those dissatisfied (24.9%). Comparatively speaking, the post-80s are the least satisfied generation. The post-90s and the post-70s report about the same level of satisfaction.

The statistics do not offer sufficient evidence to confirm the claim that blocked mobility pre-occupies youth perceptions. All that can be said is that neither satisfaction nor optimism is the prevalent sentiment among all generations. To verify the effect of blocked upward mobility on unrest youth, a more focused investigation is necessary.

## **VI. Correlates of Dissent Youth in Hong Kong**

### **6.1 Social Attitudes of Dissent**

One of the research objectives of the present study is to examine the perceptions and attitudes of socially discontented youth. We have measured the extent of their discontent by 5 social attitudes reflected in their responses to the following questions: (1) whether or not they support the Legislative Council's (LegCo) approval for the High Speed Rail budget in January 2010; (2) evaluation towards LegCo members of Functional Constituencies after LegCo approved the High Speed Rail budget; (3) which side they support in various incidents of conflicts between the HKSAR Government and concern groups on conservation issues; (4) their evaluation of democratic progress in Hong Kong since 1997; and (5) which political party in Hong Kong they most support. Youth are considered to be anti-establishment or discontented if they do not support LegCo's approval of a budget for the High Speed Rail project; if they have a negative evaluation toward Functional Constituencies; if they support concern groups rather than Government in clashes between the two; and if they support pro-democracy parties rather than pro-establishment parties. The findings, shown in Tables 6.1 to 6.5, reveal to what extent the younger generations possess dissenting social attitudes.

According to Table 6.1, a majority of all respondents (53.9%) support LegCo's approval of the budget for the High Speed Rail while 40.1% oppose it. Comparing generations, the most opposed generation is the post-90s, 46.9% of whom oppose LegCo budget approval. The post-80s have a slightly lower percentage (44.4%) of opposition. Moreover, within the post-90s and the post-80s there is almost an equal split between those who support and oppose the budget approval. By contrast, a notable majority (60.7%) of the "baseline"



post-70s support LegCo's approval of the High Speed Rail budget. The opposition to the high speed rail has, however, dropped slightly compared to findings from an earlier survey on constitutional reform that was conducted in late January to early February 2010 with adults aged 18 or above as the target (January-survey). The percentages in brackets in Table 6.1 show the findings from the January-survey. The main change is that over time, the sentiment against the high speed rail diminished. The percentage of the post-70s against the high speed rail drops from 40% to 31.6%, and among the post-80s from 53% to 44.4%. As opposition fell, the percentages supporting high speed rail increased in both generations after February 2010. This illustrates that anti-establishment sentiment can wax and wane over time, depending on the situation. More January-survey findings have already been reported in Chapter III.

Table 6.1 Support LegCo to Approve Budget for High Speed Rail

(支持立法會一月份通過撥款 669 億俾政府興建高速鐵路嗎?)

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s "Baseline"	All
	%	%	%	%
Don't support / Strongly don't support (唔支持 / 非常唔支持)	46.9	44.4 (53.0)	31.6 (40.0)	40.1
Support / Strongly support (支持 / 非常支持)	49.3	49.6 (42.0)	60.7 (57.4)	53.9
Don't know (唔知道 / 好難講)	3.8	6.0 (5.0)	7.7 (2.6)	6.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

$p < 0.001$  (i.e. difference in attitude among generations are found to be statistically significant at probability less than 0.001)

*Percentages in brackets refer to January-survey.*

Table 6.2 Evaluation of Functional Constituencies after LegCo Approved High Speed Rail Budget (立法會通過撥款興建高鐵，有冇改變你對立法會功能組別印象呢?)

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s “Baseline”	All
	%	%	%	%
Worsens (變差)	21.9	22.9 (25.3)	17.1 (22.0)	20.4
Remains negative (冇改變：一向覺得差)	31.2	30.6 (32.3)	26.5 (28.3)	29.2
Becomes better (變好)	6.0	1.6 (4.5)	5.4 (6.8)	4.3
Remains good (冇改變：一向覺得好)	11.6	9.0 (11.1)	12.4 (12.0)	11.0
No definite views (一直冇乜特別看法)	27.0	32.2 (24.2)	31.4 (27.7)	30.5
Don't know (唔知道/好難講)	2.4	3.6 (2.5)	7.3 (3.1)	4.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

p < 0.001

*Percentages in brackets refer to January-survey.*

The findings with respect to respondents' evaluation of Functional Constituencies (FCs) after LegCo approved the High Speed Rail budget is shown in Table 6.2. Some 29.2% of all respondents continued to have a poor evaluation of the FCs while 20.4% indicated their evaluation had worsened. Comparing generations, a majority of both the post-90s (53.1%) and the post-80s (53.5%) hold a negative evaluation towards the LegCo members from the FCs after the approval of High Speed Rail budget (Table 6.2). The percentage of the “baseline” post-70s opposing the approval of the budget (43.6%) is lower than for the other generations, but those against clearly out-number those who are in favor. Again, the post-90s are as negative towards the FCs as the post-80s, and the “baseline” post-70s group is also

inclined towards an unfavorable evaluation. A comparison with the January-survey shows that, like anti-high speed rail sentiment, the negative evaluation towards the FCs drops slightly over time.

Table 6.3 Conflicts between Government and Environmental Concern Groups over Conservation Issues (政府與民間團體就保育問題有過多次激烈爭論及衝突，你認同政府定係民間團體嘅立場呢？)

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s “Baseline”	All
	%	%	%	%
Support Concern Groups more (完全/大部分認同民間團體)	43.3	35.8	30.7	35.9
Half-half (政府同民間團體一半一半)	32.8	35.7	37.2	35.5
Support Government more (完全/大部分認同政府)	19.2	18.9	23.9	20.9
Support neither (兩面都唔認同)	0.4	2.7	2.9	2.1
Don't know (唔知道/冇意見)	4.3	6.9	5.2	5.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

$p < 0.001$

Regarding conflicts between government and environmental concern groups (Table 6.3), the post-90s give the strongest support to concern groups (43.3%) while the post-80s come second (35.8%). Not surprisingly, the “baseline” post-70s are most supportive to the government but the percentage (23.9%) is still lower than their unsupportive counterpart (30.7%).

Table 6.4 Political Party Most Supported (最支持香港邊個政黨或政團呢?)

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s “Baseline”	All
	%	%	%	%
Democratic Party (民主黨)	6.8	9.1 (13.1)	9.4 (14.7)	8.6
League of Social Democrats (社民連)	6.2	4.9 (11.0)	2.3 (3.4)	4.2
Civic Party (公民黨)	6.4	5.6 (6.8)	8.1 (7.3)	6.8
Pan-democrats (其他民主派/泛民主派)	2.9	5.6 (9.9)	5.0 (10.2)	4.7
Pro-establishment (建制派)	5.0	4.7 (8.4)	9.2 (14.7)	6.5
Independent / Neutral (獨立 / 中間 / 無黨派)	72.7	70.1 (50.8)	66.0 (49.7)	69.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

p < 0.001

*Percentages in brackets refer to January-survey.*

Generational comparisons show that, in response to the first 3 dissenting social attitudes, the post-90s are as anti-establishment as, or even more so, than the post-80s. This pattern extends to the liberal end of the political spectrum. Table 6.4 shows that in the post-80s generation, the ratio of those supporting “moderate” liberals (i.e. the Democratic Party) to radical liberals (i.e. the League of Social Democrats) is about 2 to 1. Within the post-90s, however, the proportion changes drastically to close to 1 to 1. Comparing the percentages with the January-survey, the trend appears somewhat counter-intuitive. The League of Social Democrats (LSD) is said to appeal to the younger generations. The present findings show the support for the LSD from the post-80s has dropped from 11.0% in January 2010 to 4.9% in May. Almost all political parties have lost support in the same period (except that

slightly more of the post-70s support the Civic Party). On the other hand, there is a notable increase in the percentage of post-80s and post-70s who say they are politically neutral.

Table 6.5 Democratic Progress since 1997

(自 1997 年回歸以來，你覺得香港民主發展步伐方面係太快、太慢，定係適中呢？)

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s “Baseline”	All
	%	%	%	%
Too slow (太慢)	45.1	50.7	42.1	45.8
About right (適中)	49.6	42.7	48.0	46.7
Too fast (太快)	4.5	3.0	4.2	3.9
Don't know (唔知道/好難講)	0.7	3.6	5.7	3.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0


p < 0.001

The post-80s are the most critical to the progress of democratization in Hong Kong since 1997. Table 6.5 shows that slightly more than half (50.7%) of them find the democratic progress of Hong Kong too slow, compared with 45.1% of the post-90s and 42.1% of post-70s.

Figure 6.6 below summarizes the findings about the discontent of the youth population towards 4 socio-political issues (political affiliation is omitted.) While the social commentators have earlier drawn attention to the dissent among the post-80s generation, our survey findings indicate that a more detailed examination of generational differences invites particular focus on the post-90s. For two of 4 issues, the post-90s are more critical towards the establishment than the post-80s, namely in not supporting high speed rail and in favor of environmental concern groups. We foresee that with their growing involvement in emergent socio-political arguments and conflicts, the post-90s

will inevitably become the major driving force in future social protests.

Figure 6.6 Discontent of Youth Population



Findings reported in the previous Chapter suggest that respondents are not positive towards a national identity or trusting the Hong Kong and Central Governments. Apart from generational differences, are identity and trust associated with dissenting social attitudes? Table 6.7 reports the associations of identity and trust with four social attitudes. As the vast majority identify themselves as Hong Kongers, the local identity is, statistically speaking, practically a constant for all respondents. Therefore, it is expected to have no effect on social attitudes of dissent. With more variations in terms of national identity and trust in the two governments, their associations with social attitudes are found to be statistically significant. The findings hint that views on social issues are being “affected” by respondents’ perceptions of local and (alienated) national identity, as well as whether they trust the Hong Kong SAR and Central

governments. Those who do not support the high speed rail budget report, evaluate FCs negatively, support environmental concern groups, and find democratic progress too slow since 1997, are respondents that they are not identified with national identity, do not trust Hong Kong as well as Central Government. The results point to the need for further investigation into the effects of value orientations on perceptions of social and political conditions. However, with the limitation on the length of the questionnaire, we were unable to include additional questions pertaining to identity formation and trust. Ng (2007:135-136) discusses the likelihood that dual loyalty towards the country (China) and the region (Hong Kong) are not antagonistic but complementary. He comments that survey questions probing country as well as regional identification are often “guided by the implicit assumption of antagonism while neglecting complementary dualism.” He suggests “future research and civic education should take [complementary dualism rather than the antagonistic model] into consideration.”

Table 6.7 Association of Identity and Trust with Dissenting Social Attitudes

Social Attitudes	With local identity %	DON'T identified as Chinese %	DON'T trust HK SAR Government %	DON'T trust Central Government %
NOT supporting High Speed Rail	43.2	60.0 *	64.4 *	58.3 *
Supporting High Speed Rail	56.8	40.0 *	35.6 *	41.7 *
Evaluation towards Functional Constituencies				
Negative	51.0	64.9 *	78.6 *	68.4 *
Positive	16.1	10.5 *	4.6 *	7.1 *
Conflicts in conservation issues				
Support environmental concern groups	37.7	46.3 *	48.5 *	48.5 *
Support Government	21.8	14.8 *	14.1 *	14.1 *
Democratic progress since 1997				
Too slow	47.3	59.1 *	73.6 *	65.5 *
About right	48.9	37.5 *	24.0 *	32.2 *

\* p < 0.001

## 6.2 Aggregate Measure of Dissenting Attitudes

The above four social attitudes of dissent and political affiliation indicate how much discontent the youth population has towards the socio-political environment. To further analyze their “aggregate” level of dissent and identify the most discontented group, we have created an aggregate measure by counting how many of the following positions the respondents have expressed: (a) not supporting the High Speed Rail, (b) viewing Functional Constituencies



negatively, (c) supporting environmental concern groups, (d) finding democratic progress too slow, and (e) having a democratic affiliation. The index has a range of values from 0 to 5, with the higher the score the more discontented respondents are.

Table 6.8 Aggregate Score of Dissenting Attitudes

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s “Baseline”	All
Dissent Score	%	%	%	%
<b>No dissent</b> → 0	15.6	19.0	32.1	23.2
Little or moderate dissent	1	23.9	21.3	22.3
	2	21.9	15.4	18.5
	3	19.0	13.0	16.3
<b>Strong Dissent</b> ↗ ↘	4	<b>13.4</b>	<b>14.5</b>	<b>12.4</b>
	5	<b>6.2</b>	<b>7.2</b>	<b>7.3</b>
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mean (out of 5) *	2.1	2.1	1.7	1.9
S.D.	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6

\* p < 0.001

As shown in Table 6.8, 23.2% of respondents lack dissenting attitudes (i.e., score 0), 57.1% are a little or moderately dissenting (with scores from 1 to 3), and a sizeable minority (19.7%) hold strong dissenting attitudes (scores 4 and 5). Regarding generational differences, the “baseline” post-70s are relatively the least discontented generation; over 30% of them do not show any discontent (with a score of zero.) Both the post-90s and the post-80s have an equal level of dissent. More specifically, 19.6% of the post-90s, and 21.7% of the post-80s score at a strong dissenting level (scores 4 or 5), while the “baseline” post-70s group is not too far behind (18.1%). In fact, the post-70s group is relatively sharply split. Their proportion who strongly dissent comes close to

matching that of the other two generations but their proportion supportive of the establishment is the highest (32.1%) among the three generations. The mean score of aggregate dissent is the same (2.1) for the post-90s and the post-80s. The “baseline” post-70s have a mean score 1.7, and the difference from the younger generations is statistically significant.

Apart from generation differences in the mean score of aggregate dissent, there are also some statistically significant differences in dissent scores by demographic characteristics as summarized in Table 6.9. In general, the more dissenting respondents are male, born in Hong Kong, and educated to a senior secondary level or above. Overseas living experience and household income have no statistically association with the aggregate dissent measure. For those statistically significant differences, the magnitude is mostly around 0.5 (score range 0 to 5), which indicates respondents are not hugely divided. This narrow difference (less than 0.5) has already been found among generations (Table 6.8).

Table 6.9 Demographic Characteristics and Dissenting Attitudes (Mean Scores)

	Dissent Score
Sex *	
Female	1.8
Male	2.1
Born in Hong Kong *	
Born in Hong Kong	2.1
Not born in Hong Kong	1.5
Education *	
Junior secondary or below	1.5
Senior secondary	1.9
Tertiary education or above	2.1
Overseas living experience	
Overseas living experience	1.8
No overseas experience	2.0
Monthly household income group	
Below \$10,000	1.92
\$10,000 - \$29,999	2.04
\$30,000 or above	1.90

\*  $p < 0.001$

### 6.3 Demographic Profile of the Strong Dissidents

Those with scores of 4 and 5 in the aggregate measure of dissent are regarded as holding strong dissenting attitudes. As reported in Table 6.8, among all respondents, a sizeable minority of 395 respondents (19.7%) are identified as having strong dissent. Who are the strongly dissenting respondents? Table 6.10 describes briefly their demographic profile.

Table 6.10 Demographic Characteristics of Youth Population who Show Strong Dissent

	All Strong dissidents (n=395)	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s “Baseline”
<b>Demographic profiles of 395 strong dissidents</b>				
<b>Generational distribution</b>				
Post-90s	27.3%			
Post-80s	36.7%			
Post-70s	35.9%			
Female	45.3%	53.7%	40.0%	44.4%
Male	54.7%	46.3%	60.0%	55.6%
<b>Education *</b>				
Junior secondary or below	7.6%	12.0%	0.7%	11.3%
Senior secondary	39.6%	75.0%	21.4%	31.2%
Tertiary education or above	52.8%	13.0%	77.9%	57.4%
<b>Overseas living experience *</b>				
Yes	10.9%	2.8%	11.1%	16.9%
No	89.1%	97.2%	88.9%	83.1%
<b>Born in Hong Kong?</b>				
Yes	82.2%	80.6%	84.7%	81.0%
No	17.8%	19.4%	15.3%	19.0%
Median monthly household income group *	\$10,000 - 29,999	\$10,000 - 29,999	\$10,000 - 29,999	\$30,000 - 59,999

\* p < 0.001

Table 6.10 illustrates that strong dissidents share similar demographic characteristics regardless of their generation. The majority of the 395 strong dissidents are tertiary educated (52.8%) and were born in Hong Kong (82.8%); only a few (10.9%) have experience living overseas, and their median household monthly income is \$10,000-29,999. Generational differences are

statistically significant only for three characteristics: educational attainment, household monthly income, and overseas living experience. Among the strong dissidents, a far larger proportion of the post-80s (77.95%) have attained tertiary education than post-70s (57.4%) or post-90s (13.0%). More post-70s have overseas living experience (16.9%) than the younger generations, and are better-off (median household monthly income \$30,000-59,990). However, it would be premature to conclude that dissenting attitudes are associated with higher education, overseas exposure, or being economically better-off. The profile analysis reveals only that the youth population holding strong dissenting attitudes share similar demographic characteristics: not at the bottom layer economically, attained tertiary education, born in Hong Kong (82.2%), but only a few having experience living overseas.

#### 6.4 Other Correlates of Dissenting Attitudes

Generations and some demographic characteristics have effects on dissenting attitudes. Personal attributes are unchangeable. It is not possible to exert influence on the formation of negative sentiments among dissenting youth by changing their personal attributes. Therefore, our next step is to investigate the effects of perceptions and values on dissenting attitudes. As mentioned in section 5.9 of Chapter 5, some recent observers of socially discontented youth suggest blocked upward mobility could be one of the reasons for their negative sentiment. Table 6.11 reports the correlation of dissenting attitudes with 3 measures of self-perceived opportunities available for personal development. The 3 measures are found to be negatively correlated with the dissenting attitudes of respondents. Negative correlation means that the more dissenting the respondents are, the fewer the opportunities they perceive as available to them. Although the correlations are statistically

significant, the relationships are very weak. Respondents perceiving limited opportunities are not visibly more dissenting than those perceiving good development opportunities. And as discussed in section 5.9, survey findings do not offer evidence strong enough to confirm the claim that blocked mobility is a salient preoccupation shaping youth perceptions. As a result, we cannot conclude that perceptions of blocked mobility reinforce dissenting attitudes.

Table 6.11 Correlations between Development Opportunities and Dissenting Attitudes

Self-perceived opportunities for personal development:	Correlation with Aggregate Dissent (r)
(1) Opportunities available to same age cohort for Personal Development	-0.173 **
(2) Comparing with now, will future opportunities for personal development in Hong Kong become better or worse?	-0.106 **
(3) Overall speaking, are you satisfied with the opportunities for your own development in Hong Kong?	-0.205 **

\*\* p < 0.01

Respondents' dissenting attitudes are thus not noticeably influenced by their perceptions of limited development opportunities. Could it be that their subjective quality of life in general has an effect on dissenting attitudes? Table 6.12 presents the correlations of 3 general measures of subjective quality of life with dissenting attitudes. The effects of quality of life on dissenting attitudes are similar to those of perceived development opportunities. Measures of quality of life have very weak but statistically significant negative correlation with dissenting attitudes. And the correlations are even weaker than for perceptions of development opportunities available. Respondents dissatisfied with their life or health condition do not generate noticeably more dissenting attitudes than their more satisfied counterparts. The same applies to unhappy respondents: they are not more dissenting than happy ones. The findings do

not support assertions that dissatisfaction with life leads to dissent.

Table 6.12 Correlations between Quality of Life and Dissenting Attitudes

Quality of Life	Correlation with Aggregate Dissent (r)
(1) Overall life satisfaction	-0.140 **
(2) Satisfaction with health condition	-0.049 *
(3) Overall happiness	-0.148 **

\*\* p < 0.01

\* p < 0.05

Table 6.7 (in section 6.1) has presented the association of individual items of dissenting attitudes with identities and trust in the Hong Kong or Central Government. To further illustrate the combined effects of identification and trust on dissenting attitudes, we have examined the effects of “Chinese patriotism” and “Trust in the Hong Kong SAR Government”. “Chinese patriotism” has scores ranging from 0 to 3: zero means neither identified with being Chinese nor trusting the Central Government; a score of 1 means only identified with being Chinese; a score of 2 means only trusting the Central Government; and a score of 3 (full score) means full patriotic sentiment in terms of having Chinese national identity and trusting the Central Government. In the case of Hong Kong identity and trust, since more than 80% of all generations view themselves as Hong Kongers, there is not much variation in this item. For this reason, we adopt only a single measure of “Trust in the Hong Kong SAR Government” to examine its correlation with dissenting attitudes. “Trust in the Hong Kong SAR Government” is rated on a 4-point scale: 0 means “strongly distrust”, 1 “distrust”, 2 “trust”, and 3 “strongly trust”. Table 6.13 below reports the scores for “Chinese patriotism” and “Trust in Hong Kong SAR Government”, and Table 6.14 shows their correlations with aggregate dissent. Table 6.13 shows the post-90s trust the Hong Kong SAR Government a bit more than the other two generations, while the post-80s and

post-70s have the same level of trust. The post-90s and post-80s are less patriotic than the post-70s, and the difference is statistically significant. “Trust in the Hong Kong Government” and “Chinese patriotism” have moderately negative correlations with dissenting attitudes, and are statistically significant ( $r=-0.515$  for trust in Hong Kong government,  $r=-0.429$  for Chinese patriotism) as shown in Table 6.14. The negative correlation for “Trust in the Hong Kong government” indicates that the more trust there is, the less dissenting attitudes are. Another way of describing the relationship is that the stronger the dissent of the respondents, the less their trust in the Hong Kong government. For “Chinese patriotism”, the more identified respondents are with China, the less dissenting their attitudes. By contrast, respondents with a stronger sense of dissent have a more negative evaluation towards national identity and the Central Government.

Table 6.13 Chinese Patriotism and Trust in the Hong Kong Government among Generations

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s	All
Trust in Hong Kong SAR Government **	1.68	1.56	1.56	1.60
Chinese patriotism ***	1.52	1.57	1.93	1.69

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 6.14 Correlation of Identity and Trust with Dissenting Attitudes

	Correlation with Aggregate Dissent (r)
Trust in Hong Kong SAR Government	-0.515 **
Chinese patriotism	-0.429 **

\*\*  $p < 0.01$



## 6.5 Democratic and Conservation Inclinations and Dissent

Regarding the values orientation, we followed Prof. M.K. Lee's advice to further measure respondents' inclinations to support democracy and environmental conservation by 3 questions that force them to indicate their preference for (a) democratic development over efficiency in governance; (b) environmental conservation over economic growth; and (c) a tax increase to support conservation. An aggregate index is created to summarize and reflect their inclinations, with a range of values from 0 to 3. Respondents who score 3 have the maximum "radical" value orientation, while those who score 0 are fully conservative and pro-establishment. Table 6.15 shows the mean scores of different generations. Although the difference among generations is statistically significant, the magnitude of these differences is small, and hence showing more or less equal magnitude of "radical" value orientation in all generations. The limitation on the length of the telephone survey prohibited our employing a more rigorous instrument to assess respondents' adherence to "radical" values in favor of democracy and environmental conservation.

Table 6.15 Index of "Democratic and Conservation Inclination"

	Post-90s	Post-80s	Post-70s "Baseline"	All
Mean score (0-3)	2.30	2.32	2.18	2.27

p < 0.01

Table 6.16 further illustrates the effect of values orientation on dissenting social attitudes. All the differences in mean scores of the "democracy and conservation inclination" are basically statistically significant. The findings suggest that the influence of values orientation on subsequent social and political perceptions is not insignificant. Further research is necessary in order to examine how the causal process works among youth population. The

formation and effects of such inclination have been extensively examined under the thesis of postmaterialism since 1970s, a topic we turn to in section 6.6.

Table 6.16 Association between “Democratic and Conservation Inclination” and Dissenting Social Attitudes

Social Attitudes	Mean score *			
	(0-3)			
NOT supporting High Speed Rail	2.41			
Supporting High Speed Rail	2.17			
Evaluation towards Functional Constituencies				
Negative	2.37			
Positive	2.01			
Conflicts in conservation issues				
Support environmental concern groups	2.48			
Support Government	1.82			
Democratic progress since 1997				
Too slow	2.45			
Moderate	2.13			
Political affiliation	Democratic Party (民主黨)	League of Social Democrats (社民連)	Civic Party (公民黨)	Pan-democrats (其他民主派 / 泛民主派)
	2.43	2.51	2.37	2.49
	Pro-establishment (建制派)		Independent / Neutral (獨立 / 中間 / 無黨派)	
	1.86		2.23	

\* p < 0.001

## 6.6 Postmaterialism and Dissent

Our previous analysis has suggested that the influences of value orientations on social and political perceptions are real and significant. This leads into the issue of how values affect and explain variations in perceptions of

social, political, and economic conditions. One prominent approach to tackling this issue is the thesis of a cultural shift from materialism to postmaterialism which has triggered a series of research studies in western societies since the 1970s. Inglehart is the major proponent of the testing of this thesis through empirical research. Since his influential publication in 1977, and despite having his academic critics, his writings and research on this topic continue to serve as one of the most influential perspectives to describe and explain the effect of postmodernization on changes in values and perceptions in highly industrialized societies (Inglehart 1977, 1984, 1989, 1990, 1997, 2000). The World Values Survey, an ongoing global comparative research project conducted every five years, has incorporated Inglehart's materialist-postmaterialist value sets since 1990 to assess values change over time (<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>).

Research on the extent of a postmaterialist cultural shift in Hong Kong is not prolific but there have been several attempts to test his thesis. Ho and Leung (1995, 1997) were the pioneers to apply Inglehart's thesis and research strategy to explore the extent of the rise of postmaterialism in Hong Kong in the 1990s. They adopted Inglehart's original composite measurement of postmaterialism. Twelve items on materialist and postmaterialist values were divided into 3 sets, and each set contains 2 items of materialist values and 2 of postmaterialist. In each set, respondents were asked which value item would be the most important to them, and then which would be the next most important. We regard this answer format as forced-choice. After having indicated choices in 3 sets, the same 12 items would then be presented altogether again to the respondents. In this 12-item set, respondents were asked to indicate which one would be the most desirable, the next most desirable, and the least desirable. We will not discuss in detail here the mechanism to construct a composite score from the answers. Briefly, Ho and

Leung categorized respondents into three value types: (1) materialist (all materialist items were indicated to be important); (2) mixed type (some items related to both materialist and postmaterialist items were rated important); and (3) postmaterialist (almost all postmaterialist items were considered important and desirable.) In their two surveys done in 1993 and 1995, materialist values prevailed (75.0% in 1993, 79.3% in 1995). The postmaterialists were a negligible minority in both years although their percentage doubled in two years time (from 0.3% in 1993 to 0.6% in 1995). The mixed type accounted for 24.7% of their survey respondents in 1993 and 20.0% in 1995. In the 1993 survey, they found that value types (materialist vs. mixed type) could broadly explain the political inclination of respondents (Ho and Leung, 1995:243). Materialists tended to support conservative political parties, and the mixed type to support the liberal political camp. In multivariate analysis, being a materialist was a more powerful predictor of support for conservative political parties than other demographic characteristics and social attitudes. Only the positive effect of “trust in the Chinese government” was a stronger predictor than a materialist value (*ibid*:245). As of the mid-1990s, Hong Kong had thus not experienced any notable cultural shift from materialism to postmaterialism. As the researchers noted, “freedom, democracy, and human rights appear[ed] to be less important in [Hong Kong people’s] daily lives ..... materialism remained a dominant value in Hong Kong” (Ho and Leung, 1997:351-353).

After Ho and Leung’s works, Hsiao and Wan (2004) investigated and compared whether postmaterialism was spreading in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Like Ho and Leung, they adopted the same measurement and strategy to assess materialist and postmaterialist values. Although Hsiao and Wan published later than Ho and Leung, the formers’ fieldwork was done in 1992 (Ho and Leung in 1993 and 1995). Interestingly, in the Hsiao and Wan 1992-survey, it was found that 8.5% of respondents in HK (and 10.9% in Taiwan) had

postmaterialist values. This percentage was obviously much higher than Ho and Leung's findings in their 1993-survey (0.3%) and 1995 (0.6%). We do not have enough information to be in a position to make sense of the difference. It may be due to differences in the scale construction mechanism involved, which was often seen in Inglehart's work since the 1970s, and which has "kindled numerous research, discussions and criticisms" (Ho and Leung, 1995:230). Nevertheless, Hsiao and Wan (2004:260) reported that postmaterialist was in majority (65.3%) NOT agreed "efficiency of governance is more important than democracy". By contrast, only 31.0% of the materialists disagreed and as many as 55.1% agreed.

These local studies on postmaterialism followed Inglehart's original methodology to measure materialism and postmaterialism. The measurement assumes that materialist and postmaterialist orientations are mutually exclusive, so that respondents are given forced-choice 4-item sets to indicate preferences. However, empirical findings from the above local studies clearly reveal that Hong Kong people were basically materialist while also possessing partial but not yet fully developed postmaterialist values. It should be noted that the questionnaires used in these studies were all administered in the face-to-face interview format. Such format enables forced-choice questions to be answered without much difficulty. However, in telephone surveys, respondents have to memorize a verbal description of 4 items in each set (and 12 items although in the final stage) and then make their choices. This would definitely incur incomplete responses. In view of these methodological concerns and practical constraints, the ratings on each item in our telephone survey do not follow the force-choice format. We used instead a four-point rating scale to tap respondents' evaluation of importance on each value item (very important/important/not important/very not important). Such deviation from the original rating format is not our invention. A Hong Kong-wide survey

research done in 2000 used such an instrument (Cheung and Leung, 2002, 2004).

The 2000-survey used a five-point scale for respondents to rate each value item. The ratings were converted to the following scores: 0 for the lowest rating, 25 for the next lowest, 50 for the middle, 75 for the next highest, and 100 for the highest (Cheung and Leung, 2004:351). They used the same 6 materialist items and 6 postmaterialist items as Inglehart, but new method to calculate two composite scores of materialism and postmaterialism. The scores were actually calculated by taking the mean of the 6-item summation in each set, with resulting scores ranging from 0 to 100. The mean score of the materialist value orientation was 83.9 and that of the postmaterialist was 71.3. Although the rating and scoring mechanisms were different from those used in previous studies, the pattern of findings from both streams of research was similar in that that Hong Kong people were found to be more materialistic than postmaterialistic.

Because of the limited length of the telephone survey, we have selected 8 value items (4 materialist and 4 postmaterialist) for respondents to rate. The selection was based on their relevance to the research objective of this project. The eight value items were rated on a four-point scale (very important=100 / important=75 / unimportant=25 /very unimportant=0) following the scheme devised by Cheung and Leung (2002, 2004), except for omitting the middle response. Table 6.17 shows the mean scores for individual items as well as the composite scores for the two value orientations.

Table 6.17 Mean Scores of Value Orientations

	Mean score (0-100)
Postmaterialist value orientation	77.9
(a) protect freedom of speech (保障言論自由)	84.1
(b) move towards a friendlier, more humane society (社會變得更有人情味與更人道)	81.9
(c) give people more say in important government decisions (市民對重要政府決策有更大影響力)	73.9
(d) move towards a Hong Kong society where ideas count more than money (社會變得著重思想創意多過著重金錢)	71.1
Materialist value orientation	84.2
(e) maintain order in Hong Kong (維持治安)	90.3
(f) maintain a stable economy in Hong Kong (維持穩定經濟)	84.9
(g) fight rising prices (穩定物價)	83.0
(h) maintain a high rate of economic growth in Hong Kong (社會發展要維持高度經濟增長)	78.4

Table 6.18 reports the differences in postmaterialist value orientation among generations as well as in the social attitudes of dissent. The generational difference in postmaterialist value orientation is statistically significant, with the post-90s the lowest and the post-80s the highest. However, the magnitude of difference between post-70s and post-80s is very small. On the other hand, a postmaterialist value orientation has significant effects on social attitudes of dissent. The magnitude of the difference found in each attitude is notable. The general pattern is that a higher postmaterialist value orientation results in more critical perceptions of social and political issues.

Table 6.18 Differences in Postmaterialist Value Orientation

	Postmaterialist Value Orientation (0-100) ***			
<b>Generation *</b>				
Post-90s				76.6
Post-80s				78.7
Post-70s				78.2
<b>Social Attitudes</b>				
NOT supporting High Speed Rail				80.6
Supporting High Speed Rail				75.9
Evaluation towards Functional Constituencies				
Negative				80.3
Positive				73.7
Conflicts in conservation issues				
Support environmental concern groups				81.2
Support Government				71.0
Democratic progress since 1997				
Too slow				81.2
Moderate				75.2
Political affiliation	Democratic Party (民主黨)	League of Social Democrats (社民連)	Civic Party (公民黨)	Pan-democrats (其他民主派 / 泛民主派)
	80.7	82.9	84.4	80.7
	Pro-establishment (建制派)		Independent / Neutral (獨立 / 中間 / 無黨派)	
	72.9			76.9

\*\*\* p < 0.001



## 6.7 Predictors of Dissenting Social Attitudes

The five social attitudes of dissent are associated with generational difference, national identity, trust in the Hong Kong Government and Central Government, democratic and conservational values, and postmaterialist value orientation (Tables 6.13-6.16, 6.18). The main patterns are that younger generations, not inclined to hold a national identity, not trusting the Hong Kong or Central Government, advocating democracy and environmental conservation, and having a higher postmaterialist score will result in more critical view of social and political conditions. Table 6.19 summarizes the significant predictors of critical attitudes. The effects of all predictors on social attitudes are statistically significant except Hong Kong identity. The insignificance of the predictor Hong Kong identity is due to its almost “invariant” value among the respondents, meaning the overwhelming majority (more than 80%) have identified with Hong Kong. These predictors are value orientations, so the findings may imply that social attitudes are influenced by pre-existing ideologies of individuals.

Table 6.19 Summary of Predictors of Dissenting Social Attitudes

Individual items of Social Attitudes	Generational difference: <i>younger</i>	Democratic and conservational value: <i>higher</i>	Postmaterialist value orientation: <i>higher</i>
NOT supporting High Speed Rail	✓	✓	✓
Negative evaluation towards Functional Constituencies	✓	✓	✓
Support environmental concern groups in conservation issues	✓	✓	✓
Consider democratic progress since 1997 too slow	✓ *	✓	✓
Democratic political affiliation	✓	✓	✓

✓ indicates predictor effect is statistically significant at probability less than 0.001, except with \* at 0.05 level.

Table 6.19 (cont'd)

	With local identity	NOT identified as Chinese	NOT trust HK SAR Government	NOT trust Central Government
Individual items of Social Attitudes				
NOT supporting High Speed Rail	✗	✓	✓	✓
Negative evaluation towards Functional Constituencies	✗	✓	✓	✓
Support environmental concern groups in conservation issues	✗	✓	✓	✓
Consider democratic progress since 1997 too slow	✗	✓	✓	✓
Democratic political affiliation	✗	✓	✓	✓

✓ indicates predictor effect is statistically significant at probability less than 0.001.

✗ means no significant effect

In addition, Table 6.9 reveals that three demographic characteristics are found to have statistically significant associations with aggregate dissenting attitudes. In general, the more dissenting respondents are likely to be male, born in Hong Kong, and have senior secondary educated or above.

To better gauge the combined effects of both demographic (structural) as well as value orientations predictors on dissenting attitudes, we have conducted multivariate regression analysis by using aggregate score on dissenting attitudes as the outcome. Six demographic variables and four value orientations are used as predictor variables. Demographic variables include: (1) generations, (2) sex, (3) educational attainment, (4) overseas living experience, (5)

household monthly income, and (6) whether born in Hong Kong or not. Value orientations as predictors include: (a) trust in the Hong Kong government, (b) Chinese patriotism, (c) democracy and conservation inclination, and (d) postmaterialist value orientation. Table 6.20 presents 8 models of linear regression analysis. We first estimate the effect of generations alone (Model 1). Then we add other five demographic variables to estimate the combined effects (Model 2). Thirdly, we examine the net effect of each value orientation by adding generations as controlling variable (Models 3-6). Fourthly, we measure the combined effects of value orientations and generations (Model 7). Finally, all demographic variables and value orientations are put together to predict dissenting attitudes (Model 8).

In Model 1, the generations effect alone is minimal as witnessed by the small  $R^2$  value (0.012).  $R^2$  value indicates that generations effect can only correctly account for 1.2% of aggregate dissenting attitudes. Secondly, the standardized regression coefficients can be interpreted as the relative predictive power of predictors. In this model, being post-80s is a relatively stronger predictor (standardized regression coefficient 0.110) of aggregate dissenting attitudes than being post-90s (standardized regression coefficient 0.106). Thirdly, the regression coefficients (i.e. not standardized) can be viewed as the absolute effect on dissenting attitudes. Being post-90s increases about 0.373 unit of the score on aggregate dissenting attitudes (scale 0-5), and being post-80s increases about 0.366 unit. With such a small increment, the effects of both generations on aggregate dissenting attitudes are regarded as weak. In this multiple regression analysis, being post-90s or post-80s are constructed as two “dummy variables” which means their absolute effects should be interpreted relative to the post-70s. Creating dummy variables is a common technique in regression analysis for using predictors with categories only (e.g. born in 70s, 80s or 90s.)

Model 2 uses generations and 5 other demographic characteristics to examine their combined effects on aggregate dissenting attitudes. Three of the five demographic characteristics, sex, overseas living experience, and whether born in Hong Kong, are all measured by two categories, so that they can be used directly in regression analysis. The remaining two attributes, educational attainment and household monthly income, are originally measured by multiple categories. Hence, two dummy variables for education are created: (1) senior secondary educated, and (2) tertiary educated. For household income, two dummy variables are: (1) \$10,000-29,999, and (2) \$30,000 or above. With all six demographic variables, the explanatory power of Model 2 is as low as 4.8% ( $R^2$  value 0.048). Using five more variables in addition to generations to explain dissenting attitudes can only increase the accuracy of prediction from 1.2% to 4.8%. In regression analysis, adding many variables but gaining only a marginal increase in the accuracy of prediction indicates those newly included variables are not effective predictors. It implies that demographic characteristics are not effective predictors of aggregate dissenting attitudes.

To explore further the effects of four value orientations on aggregate dissenting attitudes, Models 3 to 6 examine each value effect one by one together with generations. In all these “generations plus value orientation” models, the generations effect is subordinate to the value effect, as indicated by standardized regression coefficients.

Model 3 illustrates the effect of trust in the Hong Kong government on dissent by holding the generations effect constant. Comparing with the generations only model (Model 1,  $R^2 = 0.012$ ), the  $R^2$  value of Model 3 increased considerably to 0.281. This means that using trust and generations together can explain 28.1% of dissenting attitudes, instead of 1.2% by

generations alone. By adding “trust in the Hong Kong government” to generation, the combined explanatory power on the “outcome” dissenting attitudes is significantly and hugely enhanced. The negative value of “trust in the Hong Kong government” means less trust contributes to more dissenting attitudes. The relative strength of its predictive power is significantly stronger (-0.522) than generations (post-90s 0.134 or post-80s 0.107). And the absolute effect indicates that dropping 1 unit of trust in the Hong Kong government (scale 0-3) yields 1.24 unit increase in the aggregate dissent score (scale 0-5). The effect of trust in the Hong Kong government can be regarded as strong.

A similar increase in explanatory power relative to the generations only Model 1 is also witnessed in Models 4-6. However, the increase in  $R^2$  value is less visible. In Model 4, the  $R^2$  value is 0.185, meaning Chinese patriotism and generations together can explain 18.5% of dissenting attitudes. Chinese patriotism has a negative and moderate effect (-0.543) on dissenting attitudes, meaning one unit drop in Chinese patriotism (scale 0-3) yields 0.54 unit increase in the aggregate dissent score. In other words, more patriotic respondents are less dissenting.

Model 5 shows that adding postmaterialist value orientation to generations effect does not enhance the model’s explanatory power much ( $R^2$  value 0.084, or 8.4%) relative to Model 1. The absolute predictive power of postmaterialist value orientation is weak (0.029), one unit increase in postmaterialism (scale 0-100) yields 0.029 unit increase in the aggregate dissent score. The apparently weak coefficient, however, is due to the wide measuring scale of postmaterialism in which single unit increment is rare. The regression analysis reflects that the more inclined respondents are towards postmaterialist values, the more dissenting they are likely to be.

In Model 6, the democracy and conservation inclination adds very little in explanatory power ( $R^2$  value 0.063, or 6.3%) when predicting dissent. The relative effect of such inclination is moderate (0.424) and positive. Increasing one unit in such inclination (scale 0-3) yields 0.42 unit rise in the aggregate dissent score. The tendency is that more inclined respondents are to identify with the values of democracy and conservation, the more dissenting they are likely to be.

Model 7 presents combined effects of generations and four value orientations as predictors on dissenting attitudes. With five predictors together to explain the dissent outcome, the model  $R^2$  value is significantly increased to 0.360, i.e. explaining 36% of dissenting attitudes. Relatively speaking, trust in the Hong Kong government and Chinese patriotism are the strongest predictors of dissenting social attitudes. In multivariate analysis, the generations effect recedes to become the weakest in the presence of the other four values predictors. This implies the personal “structural” attributes have far less predictive influence than values on dissenting attitudes.

Model 8 is the ultimate model of multivariate regression analysis because it includes demographic characteristics and value orientations together as predictors. The explanatory power of this model,  $R^2$  value 0.370 or 37%, adds only 1 more percentage point in comparison with Model 7 (value orientations and generations model). All value orientations are statistically significant predictors of dissenting attitudes, and are relatively stronger than demographic characteristics. Not all demographic variables have a statistically significant effect in this multivariate model. The findings confirm again that the explanatory power of demographic variables is weaker and much less effective than value orientations, as the contrast in  $R^2$  values of Models 2 and 7 illustrates.

Table 6.20 Relative Strength of Predictors on Aggregate Dissent

Models / Predictors	Relative Predictive Power on Aggregate Dissent (standardized regression coefficient)	Absolute Effect on Aggregate Dissent (regression coefficient) ##
Model 1: $R^2 = 0.012$		
Generation #		
Post-90s	0.106 ***	0.373
Post-80s	0.110 ***	0.366
Model 2: $R^2 = 0.048$		
Education #		
Tertiary educated or above	0.189 ***	0.605
Senior secondary educated	0.085 *	0.267
Generation #		
Post-90s	0.103 ***	0.362
Post-80s	0.053 *	0.178
Born in Hong Kong	0.098 ***	0.347
Sex – Male	0.090 ***	0.285
Have overseas living experience	-0.047 *	-0.221
Household monthly income #		
\$30,000 or above	-0.019	-0.062
\$10,000 - 29,999	0.047	0.149
Model 3: $R^2 = 0.281$		
Generation		
Post-90s	0.134 ***	0.471
Post-80s	0.107 ***	0.360
Trust in Hong Kong government	-0.522 ***	-1.242

# Generations, education, and household monthly income are each represented by 2 dummy variables.

## Regression coefficient indicates the amount of change in aggregate dissent given a one-unit change in the value of each predictor, given that all other predictors in the model are held constant.

Models / Predictors	Relative Predictive Power on Aggregate Dissent (standardized regression coefficient)	Absolute Effect on Aggregate Dissent (regression coefficient) ##
Model 4: $R^2 = 0.185$		
Generation		
Post-90s	0.032	0.112
Post-80s	0.052 *	0.176
Chinese patriotism	- 0.423 ***	-0.543
Model 5: $R^2 = 0.084$		
Generation		
Post-90s	0.114 ***	0.395
Post-80s	0.114 ***	0.384
Postmaterialist value orientation	0.269 ***	0.029
Model 6: $R^2 = 0.063$		
Generation		
Post-90s	0.082 **	0.283
Post-80s	0.093 ***	0.308
Democracy and conservation inclination	0.231 ***	0.424
Model 7: $R^2 = 0.360$		
Trust in Hong Kong government	- 0.383 ***	-0.913
Chinese patriotism	- 0.213 ***	-0.273
Postmaterialist value orientation	0.148 ***	0.016
Democracy and conservation inclination	0.115 ***	0.214
Generation		
Post-90s	0.077 **	0.262
Post-80s	0.067 **	0.226



Models / Predictors	Relative Predictive Power on Aggregate Dissent (standardized regression coefficient)	Absolute Effect on Aggregate Dissent (regression coefficient) ##
Model 8: $R^2 = 0.370$		
Trust in Hong Kong government	- 0.371 ***	-0.883
Chinese patriotism	- 0.219 ***	-0.280
Postmaterialist value orientation	0.152 ***	0.017
Democracy and conservation inclination	0.113 ***	0.212
Generation		
Post-90s	0.090 ***	0.308
Post-80s	0.039	0.130
Education		
Tertiary educated or above	0.084 *	0.267
Senior secondary educated	0.005	0.014
Sex – Male	0.071 ***	0.226
Have overseas living experience	-0.052 *	-0.247
Born in Hong Kong	0.022	0.083
Household monthly income		
\$30,000 or above	0.014	0.046
\$10,000 - 29,999	0.042	0.135

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$

## VII. Conclusion

We started out by noting the common belief that generation differences had become influential in the genesis of social discontent and even the emergence of protest movements against major public policies. To investigate this generations thesis and other possible sources of influence on the younger generation's attitudes and behavior, this study posed four main questions:

- (1) Does the younger generation have unique socio-political orientations vis-à-vis the older cohort? Is there any distinctive diversity in values and orientation *within* this generation?
- (2) How does the younger generation perceive its own position and opportunities in the socio-economic system, and in particular the chances for improving its social and economic status?
- (3) Does the younger generation exhibit a distinctive set of postmaterialist values?
- (4) What are the socio-demographic and biographical factors that could account for diversities in socio-political orientations among the younger generation?

To tackle these questions, we used two approaches to the collection of relevant information and data. First, secondary analysis of existing survey data helps us to obtain some knowledge of the characteristics of the younger generations born after 1980 and those before then. Using data from previous surveys, we have compared across cohorts their (1) political orientations, (2) social perceptions and values, (3) identity, and (4) life satisfaction. Second, a telephone survey has been conducted to collect information about social attitudes, beliefs, values, orientations and behaviors among citizens born from 1970 to 1995 in Hong Kong. Attitudes towards recent political events involving the said "post 80" generation are also surveyed. The findings from

the telephone survey together with the secondary data analysis provide a more comprehensive view of youth attitudes in different periods of time in recent years.

We do not find consistent evidence from the analysis of existing data to support the anecdotal observation that the post-80s cohort is more radical and discontented. Some differences in orientations indeed exist across cohorts, but the differences are small and are not observable in some critical dimensions. For example, while the post-80s are less supportive of the high speed rail project, they are not more radical than the post-70s in terms of disapproval of the 2012 constitutional reform bill.

These results suggest that while there are some signs that the younger generation is more critical of the government and political establishment, such oppositional attitude is not fixed but significantly influenced by political events and mobilization. The surge of negative perceptions among the younger cohort towards the constitutional reform package after the anti-high speed rail movement clearly illustrates this point. More importantly, whatever negative sentiments exist among the younger cohorts, they do not appear to be related to unsatisfactory personal conditions. Even though young people are more critical of the government, they are in general more positive in evaluating their own situation.

In our telephone survey, the social attitudes of the post-70s are used as the baseline for comparison with the post-80s and post-90s. Various findings of this study confirm that two younger generations are more critical of the establishment, and stronger believers in democracy and environmental conservation. These findings are partially consistent with the widespread public view that the post-80s are the most radical in terms of social and political

perceptions and actions. However, our findings also suggest that the post-90s express “radical” ideologies comparable to, if not greater than, those espoused by the post-80s. An important question that follows from this finding is whether the post-90s, after engaging more and more in incidents of social and political conflicts, will become the major driving force of social movements in the very near future. Or will their political activism recede as they mature, thereby letting the even younger generation take over their radical orientation? In other words, could we attribute the generational differences to the adolescent tendencies to rebel against authority or has an enduring transformation in social values indeed occurred? The present study lacks empirical information to provide answers to these puzzles. What is required to answer them is longitudinal research on the continuity and change of socio-political attitudes of the same cohort over their life course.

Social observers have suggested three perspectives to account for social and political discontent among youth, namely, (1) that discontents are a result of generational differences, (2) that such generational difference in attitudes could be traced to the lack of opportunities for social advancements among the younger generations, and (3) that they are in general less satisfied with their personal life. Our analysis has confirmed the generations effect through bivariate analysis. However, when more factors are included in the analysis, the impact of the generations effect recedes to have only minimal importance. We have also tested the second and third perspectives involving blocked upward mobility for youth, and youth dissatisfaction with their life situation. However, our findings do not support such claims.

We have adopted two strategies to test the impact of factors that could potentially affect dissenting social attitudes in addition to the generations effect. One strategy is to add five more demographic characteristics to estimate their

combined effects on aggregate dissenting attitudes. In multiple regression analysis, the demographic model is ineffective in explaining dissenting attitudes. It can only increase the accuracy of prediction from 1.2% (generations effect alone) to 4.8%. The second strategy is to add four measures of value orientations together with generations to examine their combined effects. In multivariate analysis, generations become the weakest predictor of dissenting attitudes. The predictive power of the values model increases considerably from 1.2% (generations effect alone) to 36%. Finally, we combine the demographic characteristics with values. The explanatory power of the resulting model increases only one more percentage point in comparison with the values model. This shows again that demographic attributes are ineffective in explaining dissenting attitudes. One important discussion on value orientations concerns the thesis of postmaterialism. It suggests that a shift in cultural values is occurring that would favor democratization, environmentalism, new forms of social movement, and advocacy of non-material based social change. When ideologies and values prevail in social conflicts and actions, sheer demographic profiling of activists becomes ineffective as explanatory variables. In view of relevant theoretical discussions and our findings, “radical” ideologies, if they should exist, should be examined and explained in terms of values formation and cultural shift rather than by reference to demographic variables.

Given the limitations of the telephone survey method, we can only establish the correlational effects of generations and various values on dissenting social attitudes. It is not possible from the survey findings to uncover the causal relationships that would explain why some respondents become dissidents.. While there is evidence showing systemic relationships exist between value orientations and social unrest among youth irrespective of their demographic background, we do not yet know the causal processes,

however. At the present stage, the relationships found are still largely tentative, due mainly to the crude measures that we have had to adopt in the telephone survey. We were unable to gather information relating to the process of values formation and uptake by individuals. We also lack information on the channels through which such values are manifest in mobilizing collective social actions. These concerns are well articulated in recent literature on political socialization and political learning, as well as on the formation of civic and political values as a dynamic process.

In all, we believe it is premature to draw concrete policy directions from our current knowledge of the issues. Our study has revealed basically that radical and dissenting views showed a systemic character in that they tend to cluster together. A person's dissenting view in one aspect may be correlated with values in other domains. For example, certain views towards democracy may be correlated with views on the environment and these in turn are likely to give rise to negative evaluations of concrete public policy debates. Further study on the "radical syndrome" and its determinants are desirable before we can fully understand the rising tide of youth activism in public affairs.

One of the major policy implications from our findings is that social unrest cannot be deduced from knowledge of demographic background variables. In other words, it may not be sufficient to identify who the radicals or dissidents are likely to be. Instead, we should focus on understanding the process of *how* these young people have come to acquire radical values and attitudes. If policymakers and the society wish to know the processes and mechanisms through which youth become radical or dissident, more focused research is needed. We need further research for example on the processes of political learning through which various social and political values are formed and internalized by a significant portion of the population, then manifest in social

and political attitudes, leading finally to public actions. The influences of the various agents of socialization and learning -- for example, family, Internet and school -- would have to be traced and clarified. In particular, we believe that the school and media are at the present time important agents of political socialization and learning but we lack a systematic understanding of their influences over the younger generation in this era.

A corollary of this point is that we should not so readily subscribe to the conventional wisdom that many youngsters are driven to become discontented with the establishment because of dissatisfaction in their personal life. We found that blocked social mobility and dissatisfaction with aspects of their personal life have only a very slight effect on their negative orientations towards major policy decisions. In short, miserable youngsters do not necessarily become angry anti-establishment youngsters. Instead, beliefs in certain values that are to a large extent mainstream, for example, democracy and environmental conservation, once internalized by a sizable minority of young people, could be “triggered” by events and mobilizations to become negative sentiments towards the establishment. Moreover, rather than assuming that young people are motivated by “negative” sentiments, we must recognize the fact that many of the young people who are critical of the government are prompted by “positive” beliefs about themselves, the society, and the polity.

The second policy implication is that about 20% of youth are strong dissidents who reveal an anti-establishment sentiment towards almost every social or political issue. While the proportion is not high, it is definitely a sizeable minority. Policymakers may choose to ignore the radical views expressed by this minority, and respond only to the mainstream views in the policy making process. But in doing so, officials involved in policy debates should expect that oppositional voices will not be silent and that public actions

characterized by confrontation and expression of anti-establishment sentiments will probably occur. Alternatively, accommodating minority radical views during policy making is not an easy task either. The systemic anti-establishment sentiments would create a hurdle to involving the dissidents in policy discourse in the direction set out by the government. Policymakers may or may not respond to the sizeable minority views, but the choice made should be based on careful calculation, not paranoia.

It is also important to consider the differences between those young people who harbor a negative view of the government in general (estimated to be a little less than 20% of the relevant age groups) and the even smaller minority of “radicals” who participated actively in the recent protest movements. While our study is not specifically about this group of radicals, few would disagree that they do exhibit an oppositional subculture that is at odds with the mainstream values of our society. Nevertheless, the larger 20% “criticals” do not necessarily share those more extreme “radical” views, but may share at a certain level the mainstream values that have been promoted even by the government itself. For example, citizenship and participation in public affairs, environmental conservation, and local identity are values that are endorsed as some kind of societal consensus. Nevertheless, we cannot deny that when particular policy issues are being deliberated and policy decisions are being made, such consensual values may not be fully realized or concrete trade-offs have to be made that might result in only partial fulfilment of our core values. The “criticals”, unlike the “radicals”, may not exhibit the same oppositional culture or the ideological split with the mainstream, but their commitment to the same set of core values may lead them to be critical of the apparent contradictions between their values and the reality. In these cases, we should not dismiss them as merely radicals who deviate completely from the societal mainstream. Rather it is important to explain and communicate with them the



harsh but necessary trade-offs involved in the formulation and implementation of policy decisions.

As we maintained throughout this report, this study is decidedly a preliminary investigation of a very complex problem. Given the constraints on the scale and depth of our project and the resources at our disposal, we are unable to provide conclusive answers to our questions. One limitation, in particular, is that we have studied only the socio-political *attitudes* of the younger population in general rather than their political *actions*. A minority of the younger population harbor much discontent over the government and major policy decisions, and among them, perhaps a much smaller minority have actually engaged in protest actions of various kinds and degrees. Because of our research design and limitations, we have not investigated the nature of the channels through which discontent mutates into protest actions. We cannot answer the question, for example, of who were those young people who gathered outside of the Legislative Council last December and why were they doing that? This does not mean that our study is without merit, however. Our study has yielded a comprehensive picture of the value dispositions of the younger population in general. It also shows some among this younger population would be more receptive than others to protest propaganda because of their value dispositions. Moreover, in policy debates, public opinions will be strongly influenced by existing perceptions among the younger generation of important social and political issues and policymakers are well advised to be aware of such perceptions. The presence of discontent and radical dispositions, if not actual radical behavior, should be an important parameter for policymakers to consider when riding over major policy debates.

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# Appendix 1

## Questionnaire of Telephone Survey

24 May – 25 June 2010

香港年青人口的社會態度調查

2010年5月

SEX 受訪者性別： 1. 男 3. 女

AGE 「請問你係屬於以下邊一個年齡組別呢？」

【讀出 1-5】

- |               |       |
|---------------|-------|
| 1. 15 -- 19 歲 | 9. 拒答 |
| 2. 20 -- 24 歲 |       |
| 3. 25 -- 29 歲 |       |
| 4. 30 -- 34 歲 |       |
| 5. 35 -- 40 歲 |       |

Q1 「請問你係屬於以下邊個出生年份呢？」

【讀出 1-3】

- |              |        |
|--------------|--------|
| 1. 1990 年或以後 | 8. 唔知道 |
| 2. 1980 年或以後 | 9. 拒答  |
| 3. 1970 年或以後 |        |

「以下係一啲對社會發展唔同嘅價值觀，對你嚟講有幾重要呢？」

Q2 「社會發展要『維持高度經濟增長』，你覺得有幾重要呢？

係非常唔重要，唔重要，重要定係非常重要呢？」

【讀出 1-4】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔重要 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔重要   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 重要    |            |
| 4. 非常重要  |            |

Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Telephone Survey

Q3 「『維持穩定嘅經濟』，對你嚟講有幾重要呢？」

【讀出 1-4】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔重要 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔重要   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 重要    |            |
| 4. 非常重要  |            |

Q4 「『維持治安』，對你嚟講有幾重要呢？」

【讀出 1-4】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔重要 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔重要   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 重要    |            |
| 4. 非常重要  |            |

Q5 「『穩定物價』，對你嚟講有幾重要呢？」

【讀出 1-4】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔重要 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔重要   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 重要    |            |
| 4. 非常重要  |            |

Q6 「『俾市民對重要嘅政府決策有更大影響力』，對你嚟講有幾重要呢？」

【讀出 1-4】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔重要 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔重要   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 重要    |            |
| 4. 非常重要  |            |

Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Telephone Survey

Q7 「『社會變得更有人情味與更人道』，對你嚟講有幾重要呢？」

【讀出 1-4】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔重要 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔重要   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 重要    |            |
| 4. 非常重要  |            |

Q8 「『保障言論自由』，對你嚟講有幾重要呢？」

【讀出 1-4】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔重要 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔重要   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 重要    |            |
| 4. 非常重要  |            |

Q9 「『社會變得著重思想創意多過著重金錢』，對你嚟講有幾重要呢？」

【讀出 1-4】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔重要 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔重要   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 重要    |            |
| 4. 非常重要  |            |

Q10 「你同唔同意民主發展比政府管治效率更加重要呢？」

【讀出 1-4】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔同意 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔同意   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 同意    |            |
| 4. 非常同意  |            |

Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Telephone Survey

Q11 「你同唔同意環境保育比經濟發展更加重要呢？」

【讀出 1-4】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔同意 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔同意   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 同意    |            |
| 4. 非常同意  |            |

Q12 「你贊唔贊成爲咗保育環境而要你俾多啲稅呢？」

【讀出 1-4】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔贊成 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔贊成   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 贊成    |            |
| 4. 非常贊成  |            |

Q13 「近年來政府與民間團體就保育問題，例如喜帖街、中環皇后及天星碼頭、菜園村等，曾經有過多次激烈爭論及衝突，你認同政府定係民間團體嘅立場呢？」

【讀出 1-5】

- |                |            |
|----------------|------------|
| 1. 完全認同政府      | 7. 兩面都唔認同  |
| 2. 大部分認同政府     | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 3. 政府與民間團體一半一半 | 9. 拒答      |
| 4. 大部分認同民間團體   |            |
| 5. 完全認同民間團體    |            |

Q14 「立法會一月份通過撥款 669 億俾政府興建高速鐵路，請問你係非常唔支持、唔支持、支持，定係非常支持呢？」

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔支持 | 8. 唔知道／好難講 |
| 2. 唔支持   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 支持    |            |
| 4. 非常支持  |            |



Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Telephone Survey

Q15 「立法會通過撥款興建高鐵，有冇改變你對立法會功能組別嘅印象呢？係變好、變差，冇改變：一向覺得好，定係冇改變：一向覺得差呢？」

- |              |             |
|--------------|-------------|
| 1. 變好        | 7. 一直冇乜特別看法 |
| 2. 變差        | 8. 唔知道／好難講  |
| 3. 冇改變：一向覺得好 | 9. 拒答       |
| 4. 冇改變：一向覺得差 |             |

Q16 「自 1997 年回歸以來，你覺得香港民主發展步伐方面係太快、太慢，定係適中呢？」

- |       |            |
|-------|------------|
| 1. 太慢 | 8. 唔知道／好難講 |
| 2. 適中 | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 太快 |            |

Q17 「自 1997 年回歸以來，你有冇參加過示威集會、遊行呢？」  
【讀出 1-4】

- |         |            |
|---------|------------|
| 1. 一次都冇 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 好少   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 間中   |            |
| 4. 經常   |            |

Q18 「無論以往你有冇參加過示威集會遊行，你事前有冇留意有關消息呢？」

- |                |               |
|----------------|---------------|
| 1. 冇留意【跳問 Q21】 | 9. 拒答【跳問 Q21】 |
| 2. 冇留意【續問 Q19】 |               |

Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Telephone Survey

【此題只問 Q18 答 "有留意" 的受訪者】

Q19 「咁你主要係靠乜嘢方法得知示威集會遊行嘅消息呢？」

【讀出 1-4，可選多項，依先後次序排列】

- \_\_1. 報紙【跳問 Q21】
- \_\_2. 電視【跳問 Q21】
- \_\_3. 其他人口頭通知【跳問 Q21】
- \_\_4. 上網或手機短訊【續問 Q20】
- \_\_5. 其他(註明)【跳問 Q20】
- \_\_8. 唔知道／冇意見【跳問 Q20】
- \_\_9. 拒答【跳問 Q20】
- \_\_0. 唔留意有關消息【跳問 Q20】

【此題只問 Q19 答 "上網或手機短訊" 的受訪者】

Q20 「咁你又主要係靠以下乜個途徑知道示威集會遊行嘅消息呢？」

【讀出 1-6，可選多項，依先後次序排列】

- \_\_1. facebook
- \_\_2. 即時通訊軟件
- \_\_3. blog
- \_\_4. 特定網站
- \_\_5. email
- \_\_6. 手機短訊
- \_\_7. 其他(註明)】
- \_\_8. 唔知道／冇意見
- \_\_9. 拒答

Q21 「你滿唔滿意香港嘅經濟發展呢？」

【讀出 1-5】

- 1. 非常唔滿意
- 2. 唔滿意
- 3. 一般
- 4. 滿意
- 5. 非常滿意
- 8. 唔知道／冇意見
- 9. 拒答

Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Telephone Survey

Q22 「你滿唔滿意香港嘅政治發展呢？」

【讀出 1-5】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔滿意 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔滿意   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 一般    |            |
| 4. 滿意    |            |
| 5. 非常滿意  |            |

Q23 「你滿唔滿意香港嘅環境保育情況呢？」

【讀出 1-5】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔滿意 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔滿意   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 一般    |            |
| 4. 滿意    |            |
| 5. 非常滿意  |            |

Q24 「整體嚟講，你覺得自己嘅生活質素係點呢？」

【讀出 1-5】

- |        |            |
|--------|------------|
| 1. 非常差 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 差   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 一般  |            |
| 4. 好   |            |
| 5. 非常好 |            |

Q25 「整體嚟講，你滿唔滿意自己嘅健康呢？」

【讀出 1-5】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔滿意 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔滿意   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 一般    |            |
| 4. 滿意    |            |
| 5. 非常滿意  |            |

Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Telephone Survey

Q26 「整體嚟講，你覺得開唔開心呢？」

【讀出 1-5】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔開心 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔開心   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 一般    |            |
| 4. 開心    |            |
| 5. 非常開心  |            |

Q27 「請問你有幾認同自己係香港人呢？」

【讀出 1-5】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔認同 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔認同   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 一般    |            |
| 4. 認同    |            |
| 5. 非常認同  |            |

Q28 「請問你有幾認同自己係中國人呢？」

【讀出 1-5】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔認同 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔認同   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 一般    |            |
| 4. 認同    |            |
| 5. 非常認同  |            |

Q29 「整體嚟講，你信唔信任香港政府呢？」

【讀出 1-5】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔信任 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔信任   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 一般    |            |
| 4. 信任    |            |
| 5. 非常信任  |            |

Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Telephone Survey

Q30 「整體嚟講，你信唔信任中央政府呢？」

【讀出 1-5】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔信任 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔信任   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 一般    |            |
| 4. 信任    |            |
| 5. 非常信任  |            |

Q31 「你認為同你年齡相近嘅香港人，喺香港各方面發展嘅機會多唔多呢？」

【讀出 1-5】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 完全冇機會 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 好少機會  | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 機會一般  |            |
| 4. 幾多機會  |            |
| 5. 非常多機會 |            |

Q32 「你認為同你年齡相近嘅香港人，未來喺香港各方面發展嘅機會，同依家相比，係會好啲、差唔多，定係差啲？」

【讀出 1-3】

- |         |            |
|---------|------------|
| 1. 比依家差 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 差唔多  | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 比依家好 |            |

Q33 「整體嚟講，你滿唔滿自己喺香港所得到嘅發展機會呢？」

【讀出 1-5】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔滿意 | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 2. 唔滿意   | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 一般    |            |
| 4. 滿意    |            |
| 5. 非常滿意  |            |

Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Telephone Survey

Q34 「請問你接唔接受自己到國內升學呢？」

【讀出 1-4】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔接受 | 7. 冇話接唔接受  |
| 2. 唔接受   | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 3. 接受    | 9. 拒答      |
| 4. 非常接受  |            |

Q35 「請問你接唔接受自己到國內就業呢？」

【讀出 1-4】

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. 非常唔接受 | 7. 冇話接唔接受  |
| 2. 唔接受   | 8. 唔知道／冇意見 |
| 3. 接受    | 9. 拒答      |
| 4. 非常接受  |            |

ELECTOR 「請問你係唔係登記選民呢？」

- |               |                     |
|---------------|---------------------|
| 1. 唔係【跳問 Q41】 | 8. 不唔自己是否選民【跳問 Q41】 |
| 2. 係【續問 Q36】  | 9. 拒答【跳問 Q41】       |

【此題只問登記選民】

Q36 「請問你係邊一區嘅登記選民呢？」

- |          |        |
|----------|--------|
| 1. 港島選區  | 8. 唔清楚 |
| 2. 九龍東選區 | 9. 拒答  |
| 3. 九龍西選區 |        |
| 4. 新界東選區 |        |
| 5. 新界西選區 |        |

【此題只問登記選民】

Q37 「五月十六日嘅立法會補選，請問你有冇投票呢？」

- |              |               |
|--------------|---------------|
| 1. 冇【跳問 Q41】 | 9. 拒答【跳問 Q41】 |
| 2. 冇【續問 Q38】 |               |

Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Telephone Survey

【此題只問有去補選投票的選民】

Q38 「咁你投票俾邊個候選人呢？」

【讀出 1-4】

- |                     |         |
|---------------------|---------|
| 1. 公社兩黨候選人（公民黨／社民連） | 8. 唔記得  |
| 2. 大專 2012 候選人      | 9. 拒絕回答 |
| 3. 其他候選人            |         |
| 4. 投白票              |         |

【此題只問有去補選投票的選民】

Q39 「咁你去補選投票，係為咗履行公民責任多啲，定係支持五區公投多啲呢？」

- |             |            |
|-------------|------------|
| 1. 履行公民責任多啲 | 8. 唔知道／好難講 |
| 2. 支持五區公投多啲 | 9. 拒答      |
| 3. 兩樣都係     |            |
| 4. 兩樣都唔係    |            |

Q40 「你最支持香港邊個政黨或政團呢？」

【不用讀出答案】

- |               |             |
|---------------|-------------|
| 1. 民建聯        | 66. 沒有      |
| 2. 民主黨        | 77. 其他（註明）  |
| 3. 公民黨        | 88. 唔知道／好難講 |
| 4. 社民連        | 99. 拒絕回答    |
| 5. 自由黨        |             |
| 6. 民協         |             |
| 7. 街工         |             |
| 8. 工聯會        |             |
| 9. 職工盟        |             |
| 10. 泛民主派      |             |
| 11. 一般保守或建制派  |             |
| 12. 獨立、中間或無黨派 |             |

Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Telephone Survey

「為咗方便分析不同背景人士嘅意見，想問你一啲簡單嘅個人資料。」

EDU 「請問你嘅教育程度去到邊呢？」

1. 冇受教育或不識字
2. 小學
3. 初中（中一至中三）
4. 高中（中四至中七／工業學院）
5. 大專或大學（非學士／學士學位）
6. 研究院或以上（碩士／博士）
9. 拒答

OVERSEAS 「唔計喺內地及澳門，請問你有冇喺香港以外生活、讀書或者工作超過一年呢？」

1. 有【跳問 BIRTH】
2. 有【續問 OVERSEA1】
9. 拒絕回答【跳問 BIRTH】

【此題只問曾在外地生活、讀書或者工作超過一年的受訪者】

OVERSEA1 「咁總共大約喺外地生活咗幾多年呢？」

\_\_\_\_\_ 年【寫下】 88. 忘記 99. 拒絕回答

BIRTH 「請問你係喺邊道出世呢？係香港、中國大陸，定係其他地方呢？」

1. 香港【跳問 WORK】
2. 中國大陸【續問 LIVE】
3. 澳門【續問 LIVE】
4. 其他地方【續問 LIVE】
9. 拒絕回答【跳問 WORK】

【此題只問非香港出生的受訪者】

LIVE 「你喺香港定居咗幾多年呢？」

【讀出 1-4】

1. 少於 7 年
2. 7 至少於 15 年
3. 15 至少於 25 年
4. 25 年或以上
8. 忘記
9. 拒絕回答



Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Telephone Survey

**WORK** 「請問你而家有冇全職工作呢？」【冇：追問沒有工作原因】

1. 有全職工作
2. 冇：失業／待業
3. 冇：退休
4. 冇：主理家務
5. 冇：學生
6. 冇：其他（患病／休息／只作兼職）
9. 拒答

**HINCOME** 「請問你屋企嘅家庭每個月嘅總收入大約有幾多呢？」

【讀出 1-5】

1. 一萬以下
2. 一萬至三萬以下
3. 三萬至五萬以下
4. 五萬至十萬以下
5. 十萬或以上
8. 不定／不知道
9. 拒絕回答
0. 沒有收入

\*\*「問卷已經完成，多謝你接受我哋嘅訪問，拜拜！」\*\*